PROJECT CHECO
Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations
THE FALL OF LIMA SITE 85
(9 AUGUST 1968)
HQ PACAF DIRECTORATE TACTICAL EVALUATION CHECO DIVISION
Prepared By: Captain Edward Vallentiny
Project CHECO, 7th Air Force, DOAC
THE FALL OF SITE '85
The succeeding day, the Embassy at Vientiane commented on this attempt.
"We can conclude that aerial attack represented enemy effort to get at navigation facility which could be reached on ground only at heavy cost. Theoretically, enemy could resort to this technique again, either at Site '85 or elsewhere. However, it should be noted that this attack was largely unsuccessful and two aircraft were lost".
"On basis of available information we regard aerial raid as highly unusual variation in normal pattern of enemy tactics and do not believe this one incident necessarily introduces new dimension to war in Laos ... we are presently reviewing questions of air defense at Site '85...".
Apparently the enemy was also aware that the air attack had been "largely unsuccessful", for within a few days he began further troop movements toward what became the third and final attempt to take Phou Pha Thi (Site '85).
Preparation For The Final Attempt:
Discounting the exception of a few probes, the flushing of the Pathet Lao five man patrol, and the repulsed attempt at Phou Den Din (12km east of Phou Pha Thi) in mid-December, the enemy had made no determined ground moved against Site '85 prior to mid-January.
Almost at once, following the unsuccessful Colt attack of 12 January, this trend was reversed. On 14 January, a force of about 300 Pathet Lao and NVA troops equipped with mortars and one recoilless rifle (RR) were located only 15km north-northeast of Site '85. By 17 January, 100 enemy troops had shifted to positions only 13km north of Phou Pha Thi (Site '85) and enough concern was generated by these moves to induce Lao refugees to begin fleeing the Site 111 area (8km north of Phou Pha Thi).
CAS commented on the 20th:
"If the enemy could move in large numbers of troops into an area north of Phou Pha Thi, he would have the second jaw for a pinier movement. Probably the first indication of a serious enemy intent to take Phou Pha Thi would be the capture of Phou Den Din (UH 7661)...."
THE FALL OF SITE '85 That indication was not long in coming. An informant had reported that on 19 January a five battalion group of Pathet Lao and NVA had moved west from San Neua (VH 0158). These units separated into two task forces, one force of three battalions with one 105mm howitzer moved allegedly to attack Phou Den Din, 12km east of Site '85 (UH 7661); the other two battalions, also possessing a 105mm howitzer, were to capture a location about 19km southeast of Phou Pha Thi.
Three days later these positions, as well as Site 179 (17km south of Site '85), fell to the enemy. A pattern of encirclement of Phou Pha Thi from the north clockwise to the south was beginning to take shape.
This pattern was not ignored by friendly forces at Phou Pha Thi.
They fully realized that the enemy could mount a heavy assault against Site '85 if he was willing to accept the losses.
They were also aware that a combined attack of artillery and mortar fire and a ground assault, with a repeat AN-2 Colt attack, was a possibility.
But as January drew to a close, the primary concern of the defenders of Site '85 was the threat of the enemy moving near enough to direct artillery, mortar and rocket fire against Phou Pha Thi.
Defensive Reactions In January:
Subsequent to the AN-2 Colt attack, the air defense of the site had been bolstered by the addition of two captured 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns, and later a captured Russian 85mm anti-aircraft gun.
Reinforcement of the garrison at that time was not deemed necessary.
However, to counter the threat of enemy artillery firing from long ranges and the enemy concentrating supplies and men against the site, four measures were taken.
First, the guerrillas planned to maintain a 12km defensive perimeter around Phou Pha Thi.
Second, a 105mm howitzer was transported by helicopter from Site 98 to Site '85.
Third, the guerrilla defenders in the area stepped up their small patrol activity to identify and locate enemy positions for subsequent air-strikes.
Finally, on 2 February General Vang Pao placed one of his two top field commanders in charge of Phou Pha Thi area and gave him the mission of recapturing certain positions, among them Phou Den Din and Site 179. However, these two positions were never retaken. Air-strike Support for Site '85
The following information for the period 1 December 1967 - 31 January 1968, indicates the total U.S.A.F. air commitment in actual strike sorties in Barrel Roll and the generally increased attention devoted to the Site '85 area (primarily east of Site '85, from which direction the threat was developing):
Dec. Jan.Sorties in Barrel Roll 903 798Sorties within 30km of Site '85 128 165
The general, though certainly not exclusive, modus operandi was to launch A-1 aircraft to strike targets in the morning; these aircraft would then perform as FACs for later fragged and diverted jets. Similar strike activities were conducted in the afternoon, although by no means were all strikes FAC-directed. During hours of darkness, A-26s were used to patrol the area on armed recon missions. In addition, beginning the end of November, the Site '85 facility began directing strikes in the Barrel Roll area.
Procedures had already been established for Site '85 to direct air-strikes in its own defense. Although by the end of January, 92 strike missions in the Barrel Roll area had been directed by the site, no test of self defense strike procedures had been conducted. On 25 January, such a "test exercise" was initiated by the site. However, the test was not pre-announced and was not coordinated with higher headquarters beforehand.
THE FALL OF SITE '85 Furthermore, the proper procedures were not followed. Under such circumstances, and where there had been no prior indication of actual danger to the site, difficulties developed in trying to provide the requested support for a "test" when resources were vitally needed elsewhere for combat operations.
At the site, this test was judged a failure, but even with the unfavorable conditions under which the test was held, the exercise was anything but a total loss. Subsequently, additional procedures for conducting tests were worked out. Other changes in actual procedures, described later in this study, greatly simplified operations as more experience was disseminated and the enemy threat mounted. When circumstances called for actual implementation, there was no repeat of the difficulties experienced in the test.
It has already been pointed out that during the month of January, 165 actual strike sorties were flown within 30km of Site '85, mostly to the east where the threat was building. Over 64% of these were launched after 22 January and followed the enemy successes at Phou Den Din and to the south. The number of strikes rose to a peak on 30 January when 45 sorties, over one-quarter of the monthly total, hit within the 30 km area of Site '85. This increased effort was permitted by the fact that no ROLLING THUNDER missions flew on that day due to the Tet truce.
On the 31st, the same day as the outbreak of the Tet Offensive in South Vietnam, no strikes hit within 30km of Phou Pha Thi. On 1 February, thirty strike sorties hit around Site '85. This was followed by twelve days of reduced air activity in close proximity to the site. Of the 473 strike sorties which USAF flew within 30km of Site '85 in February, only 52 were flown from 1-13 February.
Midway in this period of relative inactivity, on 7 February, 7AF at Tan Son Nhut queried the office of the Air Attache in Vientiane about the dangers to Site '85.
The message ended:
"Do you have targets in area on which you desire strikes? 7AF will attempt to provide whatever assistance deemed necessary to insure safety of LS-85"
THE FALL OF SITE '85 The Attache Office responded the next day, 8 February, summarizing the defensive situation:
"The approaches to the top of Phou Pha Thi are... virtually a vertical climb and those avenues which can be traversed are heavily mined... The enemy is presently maneuvering up to, and occasionally inside a 12km radius of Phou Pha Thi. He is probably trying to get into position to mount a combined 105mm plus mortar assault to be followed by ground probes. CAS ADA troops are maintaining a 12km perimeter around the site and as long as they are able to do this, do not believe Site '85 can be taken."
The message from the Attache Office went on to state that if the enemy concentrated a large enough force (four battalions) and was willing to accept the losses, Phou Pha Thi could be taken. This course was expected to be preceded by sufficient warning to permit site destruction and evacuation. Regarding airstrike requirements, the message concluded:
"In order to prevent the enemy from concentrating the necessary force to assault this position, responsive air strikes are a vital ingredient. We now have in place on Phou Pha Thi, a forward air guide capable of directing such strikes. In addition we have validated nine targets outside of the 12km perimeter to the east for Commando Club strikes if enemy activity is noted .... Appreciate your offer of assistance. We feel that daily and nightly strike sorties on a regular daily basis will do much to discourage troops and/or artillery from concentrating in the area and at the present we have no special target requiring special assistance."
Enemy Activity 22 January - 16 February
After capturing Phou Den Din on the early morning of 22 January, the enemy lapsed into relative quiescence until the evening of 30 January. It should be remembered that during this period, USAF strikes near Phou Pha Thi were reaching the peak for the month of January. Intelligence estimates remarked that the enemy was probably waiting until he could move 105mm howitzers into positions from which to bombard the site.
About 1930L, on 30 January, enemy troops exploded defensive mines off the southern end of Phou Pha Thi. This was followed by a thirty minute enemy mortar attack around the southern outpost high on the ridge. After this, contact with the enemy was broken. The TSQ commander quickly reported that while there had been an attack near the site, it amounted to no more than a probe.
THE FALL OF SITE '85 Furthermore, there had been no injuries to personnel at the site nor damage to the equipment. To be safe however, flare ships and A-26's were directed to the area but nothing more developed.
Later assessments confirmed that no enemy troops had reached the top of the ridge; only the bottom defenses had been tested.
That same evening pressure had caused ADC troops to pull out of a village (Muong Yut), only 9km southeast of Phou Pha Thi. Evidently, this enemy pressure had been exerted by only a small force and the position was later recaptured.
From the period 31 January - 16 February, enemy contacts were few; however, enemy units encountered were generally of near company or battalion size. Perhaps significantly, one hear battalion-sized force was contacted no more that 6km west of Phou Pha Thi; another company-sized unit was discovered only 11km to the southwest. Both of these encounters were the initial contacts to the west of Site '85. The threat remained primarily to the east.
On 14 February, Muong Yut, 9km southeast of Phou Pha Thi, changed hands twice again, with the position finally remaining under ADC control.
In general, it appeared that the enemy force, while increasing, was respecting an approximate 12km circle around Phou Pha Thi. The only exceptions were the contacts west and southwest of Site '85 and the exchanges of the village, Muong Yut. It was during this period that there existed a definite lull in air attacks against enemy units in the Site '85 area. Apparently, there was no expressed urgent demand for strikes in support of Site '85.
Although the Attache Office in Vientiane had informed 7AF on 8 February that "no special target requiring special assistance" existed and only regular daily support was needed, a CAS report of 6 February had described a road under construction from UH 853564 and UH 835572. This construction had been noted since 1 February. On 9 February, CAS reported again concerning this road construction, which was an extension of Route 602.
THE FALL OF SITE '85 "If trafficable, Route 602 would provide the enemy with much easier access from Sam Neua to staging areas in the vicinity of Ban Hon Non (UH 812553) and Phou Chik Nou (UH 8157). It would afford the enemy the opportunity to roll in weapons for an attack on Phou Pha Thi. Interpretation of photography dated 31 January reveals intermittent road construction on Route 602 fromUH 853563 northwest along the south slope of the ridgeline ... The construction ends approximately 1km northeast of the enemy strong point at Phou Chik Hou (UH 817579)."
Trucks were reported rolling on Route 602 on 11 February. Unsuccessful strikes had been conducted against enemy positions at Phou Chik Nou by 13 February.
Apparently the enemy was well dug in.
Although four F-105s, returning with ordnance unexpended against North Vietnam, were directed against Route 62 on 2 February, no other strikes have been identified as having been directed at Route 602 until 14 February.
By 16 February, Route 602 had been extended to approximately 1km east of Phou Den Din; this was only 13km from Phou Pha Thi.
During this period, the enemy did not attempt to hide his intentions in the area. CAS reports abounded with references to Communist sponsored propaganda meetings in which spokesmen predicted the coming attack on Phou Pha Thi, cautioned villagers to stay clear of the objective, conscripted men to serve as soldiers and coolies, confiscated food supplies, and offered distorted promises of what was to come (a twenty aircraft MIG attack and even Communist Chinese participation in the PL/NVA attempt failed).
Activity In Late February
Although airstrikes began increasing in the Phou Pha Thi area in mid-February, so too, did enemy activity. To the east of Site '85, the 12km perimeter was penetrated on 20 February. Muong Yut, that often exchanged village, 9km southeast of Site '85, fell again to the enemy. Within four days, the ADC was seeking to recapture it. On 21 February, four additional PL/NVA battalions arrived in Phou Den Din and moved out to positions just inside the 12km perimeter. However, the attackers of Phou Pha Thi were not able to proceed so easily with their moves against Site '85. Fortune had momentarily favored the defenders.
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THE FALL OF SITE '85