28 April 1997

From: Dr. Castle, Chief SE Asia Archival Research, DPMO

Subject: REFNO 2052, The Loss of LS-85, Eleven Unaccounted For Americans

TO: LtCol Man, Plans and Policy

1. PURPOSE: This memo responds to your request for my recommendations on further pursuit of REFNO 2052 as well as my response to the undated REFNO 2052 "Position" and "Background" materials you have provided. Although these "Position" and "Background" papers were written anonymously, I was told that they were submitted by LtCol Schiff and/or Destatte. I will also comment on the materials which were faxed without DPMO approval by Mr. Destatte to Det 2, JTF-FA and the Vietnamese government on 13 February. Although I have been assured by Liotta that this unauthorized conduct by LtCol Schiff and Mr. Destatte has been disavowed by the DPMO leadership in conversations with CDR JTF-FA, I believe it is important that this continuing extra official relationship ("the old sergeant network") be examined. This is an issue which goes to the core of DPMO's credibility, long-standing efforts by Mr.. Destatte (apparently with LtCol Schiffs approval) to surreptitiously pass information to Hanoi which impedes a fullest accounting of our missing Americans.

2. CREDIBILITY: As a two-tour combat veteran of the Vietnam war, school-trained intelligence officer with a doctorate in Southeast Asian history, over two decades of unique travel throughout Southeast Asia (including the location of REFNO 2052), and the author of numerous book reviews, articles, and an internationally recognized book on the war in Laos, I will frame this case within its correct political/military historical setting. Why is this necessary? Because DPMO needs to produce unimpeachable analytical recommendations based on the very best available information. While we would never accept less than state-of-the-art computers to perform our work, LtCol Schiff and Mr. Destatte continue to base their conclusions regarding REFNO 2052 on outdated information. In an effort to protect their faulty conclusions, they have concealed and misrepresented any information which does not fit their perspective. Moreover, they are predisposed to give greater credence to the "recollections" of communist officials than to contemporaneous U.S. records and the memory of American witnesses. The result - a corrupt analytical determination which is factually, intellectually, and morally indefensible.

3. Titles do not bestow knowledge; our society demands specific standards for professional credentials. College degrees, often advanced, are now commonly required for even entry level government and private sector positions. The development and utilization of area experts, as embodied in FAO training and advanced academic work, is well established and highly valued. Nonetheless, in government service it is sometimes the case that titles and positions are bestowed because of time on the job and military rank. These "longevity awards" should not be mistaken as a validation of competence. Neither LtCol Schiff nor Mr. Destatte possess the credentials of the most junior FAO or post-baccalaureate area specialist. We don't fly in airplanes flown by mechanics who one day decided they were pilots - we ought not blindly accept "analysis" from non-area specialists.

4. Indeed, Mr. Destatte's poor record of accomplishment and inability to provide documentation for years of duty in Hanoi as a "historian," are well known to the DPMO and JTF-FA leadership. He is, according to qualified observers and consistent with his enlisted military training, an able interpreter. Advanced in rank over years to GS-15, a grade which normally requires significant managerial duties, he is now handsomely paid to supervise no one. While it is understandable why the DPMO leadership would not place him in supervisory position, his rank and apparent lack of a meaningful job allows him to insert himself into all manner of issues for which he often has little expertise. Moreover, since he lacks the training and intellectual curiosity to remain to abreast of relevant academic developments and is suspicious of those who do, he often impedes the work of better educated, though junior ranking analysts. In sum DPMO must not unquestionably accept "analysis" by those who, by reason of rank or longevity, one day proclaim themselves to be a "historian" or "area expert."

5. INTEGRITY: More trouble is the lack of intelectual honesty and intergrity shown by LtCol. Schiff and Mr. Destatte. Apparently unfamiliar and uncomfortable with the importance of rigorous oral argument and proper documentation, LtCol Schiff and Mr. Destatte regularly justify their "analysis" with misrepresentations and falsehoods. Briefly, as additional illustrations will be provided below, are two examples of their loose ethics. When asked by Mr. Rosenau and I (the analysts assigned to REFNO 2052) about the filming of the 1994 witness interview at Pha Thi mountain, Mr. Destatte consistently denied any such record. When shown evidence in a JTF-FA report that the interview was video-taped, he continued to deny any knowledge. Interestingly enough, when a copy of the tape was obtained from CILHI it showed the witness, Mr. Muc, Mr. Destatte, and LTC Pham Teo, a senior cadre and intelligence officer with the VNOSMP. The presence of LTC Pham Teo was never revealed in Mr., Destatte's report, despite the fact that Pham Teo is seen and heard to be coaching Mr. Muc on his recollections. It is instructive that Destatte felt it unnecessary at the time of the interview to inform the case analysts of the presence of LTC Pham Teo and then attempted to hide this important fact. As the initial collector, Mr. Destatte had the important responsibility of providing the assigned analysts with all available information. Surely the presence of this important cadre and his pervasive involvement in the interview would need to be considered by the analysts in their judgment of Mr. Muc's credibility? Mr. Destatte, for reasons best known to himself and the Vietnamese, concealed this information and then lied to cover-up his omission.

6. With regard to LtCol Schiff, in the presence of LTC Baughman and myself, in December 1996 she badgered Al Rosenau (her subordinate) in an unsuccessful attempt to have Mr.. Rosenau recant his analytical conclusions on this case in favor of her flawed analysis. (Explained in detail below). Specifically, she attempted to use her position to force Mr. Rosenau to support her belief that a REFNO 2052 witness was reliable, when Mr. Rosenau strongly believed just the opposite. Mr. Rosenau had been the REFNO 2052 analyst for many years prior to the arrival of then Major Schiff had conducted numerous interviews, and had written a comprehensive paper on the case. Nonetheless, she engaged in a blatant attempt to inappropriately influence his analytical views. This appalling lack of integrity and abuse of position was further exacerbated when, according to Mr. Rosenau, she later told him he "should look for another job." With such limited ethics and so

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little regard for the truth when it is personally inconvenient, LtCol Schiff has much to fear from true and open analysis. Below I detail how LtCol Schiff and Mr. Destatte, supposedly honest, qualified, well-read and intellectually engaged specialists, have allowed their professional shortcomings and personal feelings to pervade and delay much needed work on REFNO 2052.

7. CASE BACKGROUND: REFNO 2052 is the single largest American ground loss in Laos, involving eleven missing Americans from a March 1968 PAVN/Pathet Lao attack on a highly classified radar/TACAN site (LS-85) located in northeastern Laos near the border with North Vietnam. Until very recently the formerly classified nature of this project, a clear violation of the 1962 Geneva Accords, prevented a complete examination of the circumstances surrounding the attack and capture of LS-85. In March 1994 JTF-FA was provided access to the site and Major Schiff accompanied the JTF team up the mountain. In early 1994, while teaching at the University of San Diego, I was hired by NBC News as a technical advisor for a newsmagazine program on the loss of LS-85. At the same time, Mr. Gray, DPMO/CO, was in contact with me and asked that I assist with the on-site investigation. During the Spring academic break I traveled to Laos and eventually met with Major Schiff in Sam Neua city and at LS-85. Our NBC team included the former commander of the eleven missing Americans, and he and I both assisted Major Schiff. Later, in Vietnam the NBC team was able to develop new information about the attack on LS85. These leads were passed to JTF-FA and eventually the Vietnamese provided access to Mr. Muc, the alleged leader of the PAVN team which attacked LS-85. It is worth noting that Mr. Destatte, who had been assigned to JTF-FA/Hanoi for some time, had developed nothing on this significant case. Qualified area experts and good investigative skills, focused on the facts and not political expediency, produced results.

8. Upon learning that Mr. Muc would be available for interview, Major Schiff contacted me and asked that I assist her in preparing interview questions. I agreed and also provided a great deal of information on LS-85 which I had developed at my own initiative and expense. (Upon returning to the University of San Diego from Southeast Asia I was asked by Columbia University Press the publisher of my first book on Laos - to write a comprehensive study on the development, loss, and political/military ramifications of the LS-85 program. I agreed and traveled extensively interviewing diplomats, military and intelligence personnel, survivors, the famlies of those who were lost at LS-85, and knowledgeable indigenous persons. In keeping with my training as a historian I also reviewed thousands of documents at various key archives.) In short, my expertise on this case was made available to Major Schiff, and I have notes from her attesting to this assistance. I make this point because, after joining DPMO and clashing with her over her sloppy analysis, LtCol Schiff accused me of using my position to research this book. As the record shows, it was my unique knowledge on LS-85 which was solicited and provided without compensation to DPMO. And, when DASD Wold called and spoke to me about joining DPMO I specifically raised the issue of the book. I was assured by him that there was no conflict. Nonetheless, about six months ago LtCol Schiff and Mr. Destatte again raised this canard. A formal DOD legal review determined that there was no conflict on my part. Like Mr. Rosenau, I too have been the subject of lame and childish "bully'' tactics.

9. Using questions, maps, and other information I provided, Major Schiff developed a comprehensive package for Mr. Destatte's interview of Mr. Muc- an excellent basis for what might have been a very productive interview. However, as a reading of the report by any trained interviewer can attest, Mr. Destatte failed to properly question Mr. Muc on a number of inconsistencies and incredible statements. Until I joined DPMO, and had the opportunity to ask Mr. Destatte about his interview, I could never understand why Mr. Muc's statements went unchallenged. Upon Mr. Destatte's return from Hanoi in 1995, Mr. Rosenau and I met with him to discuss the significant new information (mostly in conflict with Mr. Muc's version) that we had developed from U. S records and U.S. witnesses. Mr. Destatte's reaction was total disinterest and a visceral aversion to any re-interview of Mr. Muc. Mr. Destatte explained that Mr. Muc had "cried in front of me, so I know he was telling the truth." In more than twenty years of military and academic-based interviewing I had never heard that tears were a sure sign of veracity. Mr. Destatte went on to say that another interview would be "inconvenient" for Mr. Muc. Since DPMO works for the DOD and the families, not the communist government of Vietnam which proclaims total POW-MIA cooperation it seemed odd that Mr. Destatte would be more concerned about the valuable time of a retired PAVN soldier than gaining a fullest accounting. Nonetheless, this has been a constant theme of Mr. Destatte - not to press and inconvenience the government of Vietnam.

10. THE MUC INTERVIEW.- First, it should be understood Mr. Destatte is not, and has never been, the REFNO 2052 analyst. This responsibility has been shared by Mr. Rosenau, LtCol Schiff and, until I moved to my current duties, myself. Since transferring from DPMO/CO to DPMO/AR, however my views on this case has been solicited by General Wold and others. Thus, when Mr. Destatte conducted the Muc interview he was acting as an interpreter supported and prepared by analysts responsible for Lao cases. Once he conducted the interview and wrote up his report it was the duty of the analysts, based on information not available to Mr. Destatte, to determine credibility. Nonetheless, based on his many years of working with Vietnamese military sources, one would have expected that when confronted with improbable statements Destatte would have sought some sort of explanation. He did not, but rather adopted a curiously accommodating role with Mr. Muc and his "handler" LTC Pham Teo.

11. During an analytical review of this interview, conducted by Mr. Rosenau and myself, we determined that there were serious flaws. In many instances Mr. Destatte failed to properly follow-up during the interview and in other areas significant additional information had been developed since the interview. Mr. Rosenau and I were firmly convinced that a re-interview was necessary to explain various inconsistencies and to pose additional questions developed from our newly acquired information. I am unaware of any case with this level of new information and obvious misrepresentations by the source where a re-interview has not been conducted. Since his interview of Mr. Muc, Mr. Destatte (and LtCol Schiff) have been provided with the detailed recollections of American witnesses which are in conflict with Mr. Muc's recollections. They have also been shown contemporaneous U.S. documents which shed considerable doubt on the assertions of Mr. Muc. Mr. Destatte and LtCol Schiff prefer to believe Vietnamese cadre over well informed Americans. Why? What do they fear from a re-interview? More disclosures about

how Mr. Muc's version was crafted and coached by Vietnamese intelligence officers? What they seek is for the U.S. to accept a patently false account in the hope that the Vietnamese be rid of this very troubling case. For, if we accept information which we know to be flawed and tell the Vietnamese it has been accepted as credible (as Destatte has communicated to Hanoi), then we may be assured that the Vietnamese will continue to concoct explanations for delivery through these helpful emissaries.

12. COMMENTS ON THE POSITION PAPER: Undated and purported to be the "RA response," this paper was not coordinated and reflects the views of just two people - LtCol Schiff and Mr. Destatte. Under "details," it is stated that "Muc has been interviewed five times." In a clumsy attempt to give a single interview more credibility, they attempt to say there were multiple interviews on Pha Thi mountain. There may have been multiple discussions, and certainly intelligence officer LTC Pham Teo was there to insure the "proper" story was told, but he was not interviewed five times. Why does Mr. Destatte continue to hide the presence and involvement of LTC Pham Teo? The paper says that Mr. Muc's recollections were consistent with "the best available U.S. information." This is basically true - although a good interviewer would have also questioned many implausible statements - and underscores the very reason why Mr. Muc must be re-interviewed by a skilled interviewer. Significant new information from U.S. sources refutes his version. The paper then goes on to provide a simplistic, overview of archival research in Vietnam. Since neither LtCol Schiff or Mr. Destatte, despite his self-proclaimed title of "historian" are qualified to conduct true archival research, their statements regarding the scope and quality of such work must be viewed with caution. Moreover, archival research in Vietnam has been conducted under the control of the communist government. While this may be sufficient for Mr. Destatte and LtCol Schiff, no serious researcher would ever make similar claims without full access by qualified personnel.

13. The comment that "REFNO 2052 was a ground loss is pertinent" and 'From the PAVN perspective... attack was comparable to the hundreds of actions by U.S. forces that rated little more than one or two brief handwritten entries" is a striking illustration of their total lack of understanding of this case. How does one compare the seizure of a highly visible, fixed site, with more than 150 tons of equipment, manned by nineteen Americans, and protected by dozens of Thais and hundreds of Lao forces, with other Lao "ground" losses, mostly special forces members lost in isolated areas along the Ho Chi Ming Trail? Or, that an attack in Laos involving more than ten PAVN battalions was similar to "hundreds" of other actions? What hundreds of actions involved this number of Americans and this amount of equipment? Next, they will be trying to draw similarities between air losses over downtown Hanoi and those over triple canopy jungle in Attopeu province and trying to say there are no written reports on the battle of Khe Sanh. Nonsense, pure nonsense.

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