TUTTLE.TXT Stenographic Transcript of HEARINGS Before the SELECT COMMITTEE ON POW/MIA AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE DEPOSITION OF JERRY OWEN TUTTLE Vol. I Tuesday, February 11, 1992 Washington, D.C. ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY 1111 14TH STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-5650 202 289-2260 DEPOSITION OF JERRY OWEN TUTTLE 1. ( * NOTE: There are many left out chopped up parts to this deposition, unfortunately... I have placed their exact words they used in place of the real ones in parenthesis... anything simply left blank has question marks, I wanted you to know before reading what to expect... MJL... ) 1 DEPOSITION OF JERRY OWEN TUTTLE 2 3 Tuesday, February 11, 1992 4 5 U.S. Senate 6 Select Committee on POW/MIA 7 Affairs 8 Washington, D. C. 9 Deposition of JERRY OWEN TUTTLE, a witness herein, 10 pursuant to notice, called for examination by counsel on 11 behalf of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, 12 commencing at 1:12 p.m., in Room SH-219, Hart Senate Office 13 Building, the witness having been duly sworn by MICHAL ANN 14 SCHAFER, a Notary Public in and for the District of 15 Columbia, and the proceedings being taken down by Stenomask 16 by MICHAL ANN SCHAFER and transcribed under her direction. 17 APPEARANCES: 18 On behalf of the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs: 19 J. WILLIAM CODINHA, ESQ. 20 Chief Counsel 21 ROBERT TAYLOR, ESQ. 2. 1 C O N T E N T S 2 WITNESS EXAMINATION 3 Jerry Owen Tuttle 4 By Mr. Codinha 3 5 E X H I B I T S 6 TUTTLE EXHIBIT NO. FOR IDENTIFICATION 7 1 88 3. 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 Whereupon, 3 JERRY OWEN TUTTLE, 4 the witness herein, called for examination by counsel for 5 the Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs and having been duly 6 sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as 7 follows: 8 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE 9 BY MR. CODINHA: 10 Q. Admiral, let me begin by telling you my name is J. 11 William Codinha. I'm Chief Counsel at the Senate Select 12 committee on POW/MIA Affairs. 13 You are here today because we've asked for you to 14 come down and take a deposition or give a deposition, and 15 I'll be taking it. 16 There is nothing unusual about the fact that we 17 have asked for you to be sworn. It's something we're asking 18 all witnesses to do, and it's like pledging allegiance to 19 the flag from our point of view and nothing should be 20 inferred by the fact that we asked you to do it. 21 You've come here voluntarily, so I'm not going to 22 introduce the notice of deposition or notice of subpoena, 23 because you have come before us. 24 I will tell you a little about depositions because 25 sometimes people in your position haven't taken a lot of 4. 1 them. What happens is I ask you a series of questions under 2 oath, and some questions may be accurate or inaccurate,.. 3 whatever. What's very important is that you don't answer a 4 question that you don't understand. If I ask a question in 5 an unfacile way or a way that you have to interpret what I'm 6 saying to get to an answer, don't answer it. Just say I 7 can't answer the question that way. If what you mean is 8 this or what you mean is that, I can answer it. 9 The worst thing you can do is answer a guestion 10 that I ask speculating on your answer, because when you do 11 answer a question we're going to assume that you've giving a 12 truthful answer and we're going to rely on that and we'll 13 build, as in any case, on the answers you give US. 14 Periodically during the deposition, usually at 15 breaks, I'll ask you whether you've had time to reflect on 16 the testimony you've given and whether there's anything 17 you'd like to change in it. There's nothing to be 18 embarrassed about if you want to change something. You say 19 gee, I thought about that a little more and I'd like to 20 correct the answer. I'd like to add to the answer. I'd 21 like to delete from the answer. You should be perfectly 22 comfortable doing that. 23 When the deposition is completed, we'll notify you 24 and we'll give you an opportunity to come over here and read 25 it when the stenographer actually types it up. I would 5. 1 suggest to you that it is probably a worthwhile exercise for 2 you to do. What you can do at that time, we'll provide 3 what's called an errata or jurat sheet, and those are just 4 an opportunity for you to make corrections. You may see 5 something that doesn't read right or the stenographer 6 conceivably got wrong. Stenographers rarely get things 7 wrong and complain a lot when people make changes. 8 I will tell you that in civil cases that I've 9 tried I've seen witnesses change yes answers to no answers, 10 but I don't anticipate that's going to happen here. But 11 that opportunity will be provided to you. 12 This deposition will go from when we began until 13 around 5:00 today, unless it's clear that we can finish by 14 going an extra half hour or so, in which case, rather than 15 bringing you back another day, I'd ask you to go on. 16 Let's go off the record for a second. 17 (Discussion off the record.) 18 MR. CODINHA: Back on the record. 19 BY MR. CODINHA: 20 Q. By the way, what you just saw me do is I told the 21 stenographer to go off the record. That means that she is 22 not going to record that portion of the testimony. You're 23 an admiral. I'm a civilian, and in this venue I'm the only 24 one who can go off the record, so anything you say they are 25 going to record, but I can give the orders. This is the 6. 1 only ship where I'm really in charge -- that, and my rowboat 2 at home. 3 The timing will be we'll start now. We'll go 4 probably until about 2:30 or 2:45. We'll break then for 5 about ten minutes or so and then we'll go on and complete 6 the day. Depositions are very tiring, and I urge you, if 7 you start getting tired or if you are starting to have 8 trouble concentrating on the questions I'm asking, just say, 9 hey, I need a break, or let's stop. 10 I'll say let's go off the record, and we'll 11 proceed from there. If there's any need for you to have 12 coffee sent in, water sent in, if you need a bio break, just 13 say I need a break and that will be that. 14 If I ask you a question that you don't want to 15 answer for some reason -- I can't imagine that I'll come up 16 with one of those -- you can say I don't want to answer that 17 question or I want to consult with counsel, or I want to 18 consult, and there are people we can provide for questions 19 like that. I don't anticipate that will occur here. 20 Having given you my little spiel, is there 21 anything you would like to ask me before we begin? 22 A. Nothing. 23 Q. Admiral, would you tell the Senators your full 24 name? 25 A. Jerry Owen Tuttle. 7. 1 Q. And where do you live? 2 A. I live on (data) 3 Q. And do you have a family? 4 A. Yes, I do. 5 Q. What is your social security number? 6 A. (data) 7 Q. What's your date of birth? 8 A. (data) 9 Q. And you are in uniform. What is your rank? 10 A. Vice Admiral. 11 Q. For how long a time have you been a Vice Admiral? 12 A. Since May of 1987. 13 Q. I'd like to spend a little time with your 14 background and education. Would you tell me about your 15 educational background? How far did you go in school? 16 A. I graduated from high school before joining the 17 Navy, and once in the Navy I went to the Navy Post-Graduate 18 School, where I attended the undergraduate and the post- 19 graduate school simultaneously, and I got my degree from the 20 U.S. Navy Post-Graduate School. 21 And then, while in War College, I simultaneously- 22 attended George Washington University Extension in Newport, 23 Rhode Island, and received my master's in international 24 relations. 25 Q. And, just for timing, when did you go into the 8. 1 Navy? 2 A. I joined the Reserves in 1953, but I did not go 3 into active duty until February 1955. 4 Q. When you were in the Navy Post-Graduate School and 5 you did your undergraduate, what time frame would that have 6 been? 7 A. From 1960 to 1962. 8 Q. And you said you had a masters from the George 9 Washington Extension in international relations? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. And when would you have gotten that? 12 A. 1969. 13 Q. Have you taken any other educational courses or 14 degrees that we should know about? 15 A. Well, I neglected to tell you I did attend, before 16 I came into the service, DeVry Technical Institute, which is 17 54 weeks in Chicago. 18 Q. What is that? 19 A. DeVry was a technical school, where I received my 20 first-class telephone and telegraph license. It goes by 21 both DeVry and DeForest. 22 Q. How do you spell that? 23 A. DeVry is D-e-V-r-y. And DeForest is D-e-F-o-r-e-- 24 s-t. 25 Q. You said that was before you went in the Navy? 9. 1 A. Yes, sir. 2 Q. So it was pre '53? 3 A. I can tell you exactly when it was. I was '53, 4 and I got out in '54. I was there 54 weeks. 5 Q. If you can just give me some -- it may be helpful 6 to develop some of your background in the Navy. Just give 7 me some idea of your progression through the ranks in the 8 Navy. 9 A. Well, I was enlisted, of course, and then I 10 applied for and became what they call a Naval Aviation 11 Cadet. I went to Pensacola in July of 1955. I received my 12 wings on 16 October 1956, with a date of commission of 1 13 June of '56. I was commissioned an ensign in the Reserves. 14 I went to my first fighter squadron at Miramar. I was there 15 in fighters at first, and then we were transitioned over to 16 attack. 17 And from then I went to the Post-Graduate School 18 at Monterrey, California. After graduating there -- oh, 19 before I got up there, I had augmented and been turned down 20 twice. I finally got selected for regular commission on my 21 third application, and then I went to Monterrey, California, 22 and got my degree. 23 Then I was assigned to Washington Op 94. I was 24 there for 18 months, went back to Cecil Field and to attack 25 squadrons and then deployed to Vietnam, flying A-4s back-to-- 10. 1 back. After my Vietnam deployments, I went to the War 2 College, and that's when I attended that was 1968 to..1969 3 -- that's when I got my master's. 4 In 1969, I spent one year and one week as aide to 5 Admiral Hylands, who was CINCPACFLT. From there, I went 6 back to Cecil Field, Florida, and became the executive 7 officer and the commanding officer of an A-7 squadron, 8 attack. 9 From the squadron there I had a short-hiatus where 10 I was on the staff of COMNAVAIRLANT, Commander, Naval 11 Aviation, Atlantic Fleet, before starting my work-up to 12 become an air wing commander. 13 Then I was an air wing commander before then going 14 to my commanding officer of my first deep draft, the USS 15 KALAMAZOO. And from there I became the commanding officer, 16 USS JOHN F. KENNEDY. And after JOHN F. KENNEDY I became the 17 special assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations for six 18 months, for the retention issue. At that time, I selected 19 for flag and I was assigned to DIA. 20 Q. What time period was that? 21 A. I went to work for Admiral Hayward, the CNO on 22 January '79, and I went to DIA let me say the middle of July 23 of 1979. I transferred out of DIA May or June of '81. I 24 can't recall exactly the month there. 25 From there, I went back to take over my carrier 11. 1 battle group, the first of two. I went to the Mediterranean 2 to take Carrier Battle Group 2 and Battle Force Sixth Fleet 3 in May of '83 and stayed there until August of '84, at which 4 time I came back to the States and became the Inspector 5 General, Navy Inspector General. 6 Q. That was '88? 7 A. That was '84, August of '84. In November '85, I 8 became the deputy to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, 9 and I was there until May of 1987, when I became the J-6, 10 the Director for Space and Command and Control on the Joint 11 Chiefs of staff. I was there for two years, until I became 12 my current job, Director of Space and Electronic Warfare in 13 Op 94, in OPNAV. 14 Q. When did you begin your current job? 15 A. May 23, I think specifically, of 1989. 16 Q. And you're presently employed in that function 17 today? 18 A. Yes, sir. 19 Q. That is an impressive resume, let me say. 20 A. It's longevity- 21 Q. I'm sure you say that and it's somewhat 22 disingenuous, but it is without question an impressive 23 resume. 24 I'm interested at least initially in the period of 25 time when you were assigned to the DIA in July of '79 12. 1 through May or June of 1981. That's where I'm going to try 2 to focus your attention. 3 A. Sure. 4 Q. I may ask questions in which I don't give you the 5 specific date of the question, but that's the period of time 6 that I am interested in. 7 How did it come about that you were assigned to 8 DIA? 9 A. I had been selected for flag officer, flag rank, 10 but I had never had a joint tour. 11 Q. What does that mean? 12 A. A joint tour means I had not had -- there are 13 specific billets that mean you interface extensively with 14 the other services or agencies, like the JCS is an example, 15 or Defense Communications Agency, or Defense Intelligence 16 Agency, as the case may be. 17 And it was a requirement to become joint 18 qualified, and I was not qualified, so I had been selected 19 for flag and they were going to send me to a qualifying job, 20 recognizing I had been selected amongst my peers to be a 21 flag officer. So the Chief of Naval Operations is your 22 detailer when you become flag, and he, for whatever reason, 23 known only to him, determined I should go to DIA. So I was 24 assigned there. 25 Q. Upon being assigned there, did you know anything 13. 1 about DIA? 2 A. Nothing whatsoever. 3 Q. So how did you go about getting information about 4 DIA? 5 A. Checked in, saluted. 6 Q. It would be helpful for me to know, when you 7 arrived what was your title? 8 A. I had three different titles there. I was Deputy 9 Director for Plans and Policy, I think. 10 Q. Do you believe that was your first title? 11 A. I think that was my first title. 12 Q. And what other titles did you have while you were 13 there? 14 A. I became then the deputy to the Defense 15 Intelligence. That was deputy to John Hughes. And I 16 concluded by being the Director for Collection. 17 Q. And it will be helpful for me if I know -- 18 A. Recognizing they reorganized during that time. In 19 other words, I went in assigned to Deputy Director for Plans 20 and Policies, I think, And then we reorganized and one of 21 the reorganization provisos was that I become the deputy to 22 John Hughes, who took over as first and foremost amongst the 23 divisions and directorates of DIA. 24 Q. Let me see if I can sort this out some. In July, 25 approximately July, of '79, you come in. 14. 1 A. Yes, sir. 2 Q. And you come into DIA as Deputy Director for Plans 3 and Policy. 4 A. Yes, sir. 5 Q. When do you believe there was a reorganization? 6 A. I would think -- this is solely a guess -- I would 7 say it was actually before August, because I believe that I 8 was in as Deputy Director for Mr. Hughes whenever Lieutenant 9 General Tighe came to me and asked me to take over the 10 POW/MIA issue. 11 Q. When do you believe that was? 12 A. Well, it was in August. I know that was when he 13 asked me. I just do not know which position I had, whether 14 it was in plans and policies or if I had already moved over 15 and become deputy to Mr. Hughes. 16 Q. Okay. Going first to when you were Deputy 17 Director for Plans and Policy, you apparently held that 18 position for the first month you were there, until there was 19 a reorganization. 20 A. I held it for a period of time, until there was a 21 reorganization. The length of time I just frankly can't 22 recall. 23 Q. When you came in, to whom did you report? 24 A. General Tighe. 25 Q. So General Tighe was 15. 1 A. Well, actually the Deputy Director of the DIA, and 2 then General Tighe, who was the DIA, and it was Rear Admiral 3 Kellm. 4 Q. How do you spell his name? 5 A. It's K-e-l-l-m. 6 Q. Rear Admiral Kellm. 7 A. Yes. That's the correct spelling, too. 8 Q. So you reported to Tighe through Rear Admiral 9 Kellm? 10 A. Yes, sir. 11 Q. Who reported to you on this first structure? Were 12 there many people? 13 A. I had a lot of billets; I didn't have a lot of 14 people. I don't know how many I had. I had a deputy, of 15 course, and I don't know how many division. I wasn't there 16 that long, though, frankly. 17 Q. And you said shortly after you arrived there was a 18 reorganization, and after the reorganization how did that 19 affect to whom you reported? 20 A. Well, I went to report to John Hughes, who was 21 then Director of DI, who took on far greater scope of 22 responsibilities, and apparently they had been trying to get 23 John to take on that job, but he was a national asset and he 24 -- this is conjecture -- I think he had some trepidations of 25 doing that without having someone to run the organization. 16. 1 He was a very intelligent individual, but he was not one to 2 give orders, if you care, and that sort of thing. 3 So one of the provisos was if I would become his 4 deputy, well, then that would consummate the reorganization 5 and he basically was the intelligence and I ran the 6 organization. 7 Q. For how long a time did you hold the title of 8 Deputy to Defense Intelligence? 9 A. Again until there was another reorganization. 10 They put me over as head of collection, and that was only 11 right before I left, so let me guess something like January 12 or February of '81. But as far as it relates to the 13 POW/MIA, that responsibility, once it was given to me, on or 14 about 11 August, the other migration of these different 15 titles had little or no effect, because my bosses -- in 16 other words, I was basically the titular head as far as DIA 17 was concerned on this issue. 18 Q. When you were head of collection, to whom did you 19 report? 20 A. Again to the Deputy of DIA. 21 Q. Who was that? 22 A. I think Kellm was still there. I don't know that. 23 Kellm may have left and I have forgotten even who it was 24 replaced him. 25 And then Kellm would have reported to the head of 17. 1 DIA? 2 A. That's correct. Yes, sir. 3 Q. During the period August '79 through January 4 '81 -- was that June or January that you took over as head 5 of collection? 6 A. January. That was an estimate. 7 Q. You reported to Hughes. Who did Hughes report to? 8 A. To the Deputy Director of DIA. 9 Q. Kellm? 10 A. Kellm. He may have departed. I don't know. I 11 cannot recall who relieved Kellm as the Deputy Director. 12 Q. But it was the Deputy Director, whoever that was? 13 A. Yes, sir. 14 Q. Did you report to the Chief of Naval Operations 15 during this time period? 16 A. No. 17 Q. When you came into DIA as Deputy Director for 18 Plans and Policy, what did you understand your duties and 19 responsibilities to be when you held that title? 20 (data) 21 (data) 22 23 (data) 24 25 I also had all the unified and specified command 18. 1 accounts as to interface with them. I had an assessment 2 division in which I would assess our ability to collect and 3 analyze against different intelligence disciplines --- normal 4 plans and policy type functions. 5 Q. Did any of your duties and responsibilities that 6 you had as Deputy Director of Plans and Policy prior to 7 August 11 of 1979 involve POWs or MIAS? 8 A. No. 9 Q. Let's then turn to August 11 of '79. Why do you 10 recall that date with specificity? 11 A. Well, I say it's the llth. It's within a week, 12 because, as I recall, General Tighe came to see me, and he 13 had been called to testify before Congress. And I'm pretty 14 sure of the date in August. I think it was the 16th or the 15 22nd, somewhere like that. And POW/MIA had just never 16 entered my mind since Homecoming in March of '73. It just 17 never occurred to me. 18 And he wanted me to prepare him for his testimony. 19 He wanted me to take the lead. At that time, it was 20 proposed a commander, as I recall, and maybe it was even a 21 retired commander -- because in those days we wore civilian 22 clothes, but it was either a commander or retired commander 23 -- 24 MR. CODINHA: Off the record. 25 (Discussion off the record.) 19. 1 THE WITNESS: There were three things happening in 2 August. He indicated he had to appear on the Hill, which 3 was some date. Let me say I thought it was the 16th of 4 August. It could have been the 22nd of August, because 5 there was three big events that happened in August that 6 year. One, he came in and told me that I was going to head 7 up the POW/MIA issue; two, I had to prepare for testimony; 8 and, three, I made an assessment of what resources I had to 9 bring to bear on it immediately. 10 One of them was the Naval attaches worldwide, so I 11 put out a message to all the attaches that belonged to DIA 12 around the world and asked for any information they had on 13 the boat people coming out on POWs/MIA in southeast Asia. 14 Immediately I heard back from a Marine lieutenant 15 colonel in Hong Kong that he had located allegedly a third- 16 generation Chinaman that had come out with, reported firstly 17 his daughter, later changed to his niece, aboard a boat, and 18 they come into the refugee camp there at Kai Tac, and he 19 apparently had prepared 426 remains of American service 20 personnel, and had stored them in what used to be called the 21 Hanoi Hilton in downtown Hanoi. 22 BY MR. CODINHA: 23 Q. The so-called Mortician? 24 A. The Mortician. That's exactly right. 25 So those three things happened. One, I was 20. 1 designated. Two, we prepared for testimony, the best I 2 could. And, three, we had located this Chinese gentleman. 3 All in August. So whether it was a week before, two weeks 4 before, it was a very compressed time frame, and, 5 furthermore, then I had to go out to where there was these 6 either the commander or retired commander, I don't recall 7 which -- in fact, Trowbridge is his name. In fact, I think 8 he's still working on the POW/MIA issue. Clearly, he's, 9 retired now. 10 And they had some other people there. I think 11 there was a total of 8. And they were located out somewhere 12 west of here in at that time a DIA building about ready to 13 fall down. I inherited at that time, as I recall, 52 safes, 14 five drawers high, of all the information on all these 15 POWs/MIAs. 16 So that started the train, and the first reactions 17 were, over on the Hill, on the testimony was very acidic. 18 It was very testy because what had really opened it up was 19 apparently George Brooks, who had asked for some of these 20 files and had found less than sterling analysis, and then, 21 of course, what had probed this was the boat people who were 22 coming out and making -- they had started leaving Vietnam 23 and making reports. 24 So that's what surfaced the issue. So then we set 25 up an analysis team and moved the people from wherever they 21. 1 were out in Alexandria or Arlington into the Pentagon so I 2 could have direct access to them and work directly with 3 them. And then we just started investigating and marginally 4 increased the size of the staff, tried to do better 5 analytical work, and then it evolved from there. 6 Q. Let me go back to an earlier statement. You said 7 General Tighe came to you and asked you to take over the 8 POW/MIA issue. What did you understand that to mean? 9 A. To do just that. In other words, that was to 10 become my responsibility, to investigate or look into it, 11 and whatever it took to investigate it. First the charge 12 was to prepare him for his testimony, which was within a 13 week or so. 14 Q. What did you understand the requirements were to 15 prepare him for his testimony? 16 A. To determine what -- well, determine where we 17 stood and anything we knew about it. So then I just had to 18 get with the people and see what the issues were. I got 19 hold of -- the complaint basically was the blue book, as I 20 recall, that Mr. Brooks had prepared pointing out the lack 21 of comprehensive and thorough investigation and some signs 22 of insensitivity that he had detected in the file. So we 23 tried to address those specific things. 24 Then they wanted to know what our effort was going 25 to be. Fortuitously, I put together an analyst and a 22. 1 polygrapher, and a translator. I put those teams. And any 2 time we got a report from any of these attaches or from 3 whatever sources, why we would immediately go to the site 4 and do this, and we started building up -- 5 Q. You put together an analyst, a polygrapher and 6 who? 7 A. A translator. 8 Q. So the first responsibility that you had from 9 General Tighe was to prepare him for his testimony. 10 A. Yes, sir. 11 Q. As a sub-requirement of that, you had to address 12 what I will refer to as the Brooks book, the blue book. 13 A. That was just coming forward. In other words, he 14 said take over the POW/MIA issue, and for that I just had to 15 immerse myself in it and find out all the issues. One of 16 the first issues I determined which precipitated the hearing 17 was in fact a result of the Brooks thing, so that's where I 18 just happened to start. 19 Q. You began with the Brooks report? 20 A. Yes, sir. 21 Q. And the Brooks report, does that still exist in 22 the files? 23 A. I'm sure it does. 24 Q. What was the gravamen of the Brooks complaint -- 25 that bad analysis was being done? 23. 1 A. Bad or no analysis, and that there was some 2 insensitivities, under the Freedom of Information Act that 3 they had let memorandums that these people had been doing 4 this, had made some insensitive statements on the margins of 5 some of these things. 6 Q. The Brooks report. So it was bad analysis, no 7 analysis, insensitivity? 8 A. Well, accusation of bad analysis and 9 insensitivity. 10 Q. Did you review the Brooks report? 11 A. Oh, clearly, yes. 12 Q. And did you come to an opinion as to the Brooks 13 report's accuracy? 14 A. The specifics, no, but the generalities, 15 certainly. 16 Q. And what was your opinion as far as DIA's 17 insensitivity? 18 A. Well, I don't necessarily want to attribute it to 19 the DIA. I want to say that the period between March of '73 20 and August of '79 there seemed to be -- and I don't want to 21 attribute this to DIA solely at all -- but, as I was, having 22 flown over there and had very dear friends, I thought it was 23 all over in March of '73. 24 Now the people in the agencies, not only DIA or 25 whoever else was working the issue for some period of time, 24. 1 and then we had the Presidential commission go over there -- 2 several of those went over -- one, as I recall, led by 3 Congressman Montgomery, and they came back and it was 4 assumed that there was no more. 5 And this is in retrospect now. This is in 6 retrospect. I didn't know this until I took over, and this 7 is all hearsay. And so there was clearly business as usual 8 on answering correspondence relating to POW/MIA until Mr. 9 Brooks made his report and brought the issue before 10 Congress. I am sure General Tighe was unaware that they 11 even existed. He may have. I don't know. That's 12 conjecture. 13 Q. He was unaware? 14 A. That there was anything about the POW/MIA issue 15 that was surfacing. In other words, it was an organization 16 out there like any number of cells that he has, 17 organizations, in his organization. Because it was not on 18 the front burner of anybody's -- forefront of anyone's 19 conscious mind. 20 Q. When you say that you speculate that General Tighe 21 might not have known that they exist, what are the "they" 22 that you refer to? 23 A. I won't say he didn't know they existed. I do not 24 think that he felt that there was any difficulties, that 25 there was no reason until he knew that there was any 25. 1 problems. 2 Q. I guess the difficulty I'm having right now is 3 what are the difficulties with -- acknowledging that there 4 are POW/MIAs in existence? 5 A. No. The fact that there was anyone that was not 6 totally satisfied with the conducting of the investigations 7 of POW/MIA issues, and the only time it came external -- in 8 other words, I'm sure he thought everything was copasetic. 9 until it was invited to his attention by the others. 10 Q. By the Brooks report? 11 A. Yes, sir. 12 Q. So that was one of the things you addressed in the 13 Brooks report, was the insensitivity. 14 A. Well, that was one issue. But there is no way of 15 going back and doing anything on that. That was already 16 done maybe even before -- I don't know who did it -- even 17 before the incumbent people that I inherited. They may not 15 have even done it, but it was done by people, someone, and I 19 never did go back and investigate who did it. It was better 20 picking up and going from there. 21 Q. And the second area that you were looking into, 22 the failure of the analysis, problems with the analysis -- 23 either no analysis or bad analysis -- 24 A. Or less than thorough. I think there was perhaps 25 a mindset at the time that permeated that there was no POWs, 26. 1 live POWs remaining. 2 Q. I've heard that terminology used before, the so- 3 called mindset to debunk. Is that what you're referring to 4 now? 5 A. I don't say that they went in with this thing. 6 But, first of all, there was a flood of these boat people, 7 and a few of them were analyzed as being bogus. And that 8 even reinforced anything. And we must remember or should 9 recall that there had been Presidential -- or whoever -- 10 commissions, at least two that I know of, groups that had 11 gone to Hanoi and reported there was no more. 12 Q. That's the Montgomery commission and the Woodcock 13 commission? 14 A. Yes. Thank you. I forgot the other one. Those 15 were the two. So that -- I don't know; that's conjecture -- 16 what pall that put over the issue. 17 Q. What were you able to determine in looking at the 18 Brooks report comment on bad analysis or no analysis in 19 terms of what DIA had done to that point? You are just 20 coming in. This is August of '79, you are preparing Tighe. 21 You look at what's happened. What do you think of it? 22 What's your analysis of it? 23 A. Well, at that juncture I'm not convinced that I 24 was -- I don't know. I can't recall. I was in more of a 25 reactive mode and I was so shallow. My data bank was so 27. 1 poor at that juncture. I was taking on a lot of information 2 very fast and frankly trying to -- I was reacting to the 3 environment. 4 So I don't know if I could make an objective 5 evaluation at that juncture or not. I do know, having 6 worked with the people that we had, that I was more 7 demanding on their critical analysis of the information... 8 I'll put it that way. I had to be very tenacious to keep 9 what I call an objective thing, because there seemingly was 10 a propensity to believe that it was just another ---because 11 they had been conditioned, perhaps, for this. This is 12 speculation now, that they had been conditioned by so-many 13 things that proved to be false. 14 There were all kinds of, for whatever motives, 15 were making all kinds of claims that proved false, beyond a 16 shadow of a doubt proved false. And we could never get one 17 to prove right. Even the Garwood report, we finally were 18 able to plane those down and be able to bring in, so my 19 rationale was, if we believe him on those that confirm the 20 whereabouts and movement of Garwood, then why should we not 21 believe others? 22 So that was the tack that we took. 23 Q. Let me take a couple of steps back. When you 24 referred to your data bank being shallow, are you referring 25 to your own personal -- 28. 1 A. Personally. 2 Q. So this wasn't the data bank at DIA? 3 A. No, no, no. My own. I had no experience. As I 4 say again, I just never thought in terms of POW/MIA. It 5 never even entered my mind. 6 Q. Who did you take over the responsibility for this 7 position from? 8 A. It was headed up at that time with this 9 Trowbridge. 10 Q. So Trowbridge had been -- 11 A. And I don't know where he was reporting to. I 12 don't know what his reporting chain was. I really don't 13 know who he reported to. But we sure brought it into focus 14 fast. 15 Q. When you took over, did you see a problem with the 16 hierarchy that existed in this POW/MIA shop in terms of the 17 reporting hierarchy, that people didn't seem to know who 18 they were reporting to? 19 A. No, I didn't detect that, no. 20 Q. When you came in, you must have made some 21 assessments. 22 A. Oh, yes, I did. 23 Q. As to the capabilities of the people, what did you 24 think of your staff? 25 A. Quite frankly, I thought that they were lacking, 29. 1 and in fact when I told them they were going to move into 2 the Pentagon because I needed them there, they said, well, 3 they'd put a requisition in and whatever you've got to go 4 through to get space, and I said no, you'll be over there 5 tomorrow morning. 6 And, of course, then we made a major paradigm 7 change. We went, you know, from a bureaucracy or 8 bureaucratic type handling of the thing to a very proactive, 9 and the situation called for it because we were getting many 10 questions. We were getting more reports than could be 11 possibly handled through the normal -- now I can't speak for 12 what happened before I got there, but the reports were going 13 up exponentially. 14 Q. When you took over this position, you took it over 15 from Trowbridge, but Trowbridge remained, stayed on? 16 A. He remained working for me. 17 Q. So he became your deputy? 18 A. He became the number two man as far as POW/MIA was 19 concerned. I don't think we could call him the deputy in 20 title. 21 Q. Did you have a deputy? 22 A. I had a deputy when I was down there in plans and 23 policy, but when I moved over I was the deputy to John 24 Hughes, so I didn't have any deputy over there. 25 Q. Who reported to you? 30. 1 A. Trowbridge. 2 Q. Was he the only one who reported directly to you? 3 A. Yes, that's right, as far as seniority and chain 4 of command, but I literally worked with all of them... I was 5 very much immersed with all of the analysts. 6 Q. Who was under Trowbridge at that time, if you 7 recall? 8 A. I can't recall their names, frankly. I tell you 9 what I did do. I went and got a gentleman who had been with 10 NIS when I had the JOHN F. KENNEDY, because this guy was one 11 of the finest investigators I've ever known in my life, and 12 I brought him in, and we hired him in DIA, and he eventually 13 become the polygrapher, and he's now back with NIS doing 14 polygraphy. He's one of the best polygraphers in the world. 15 Q. Who is that? 16 A. Pat Hurt. I brought him in because, one, I knew I 17 could trust him. I knew he had great work ethics and he was 18 an incredible mind for investigation. 19 Q. Who else were investigators that you worked with, 20 if you can recall? 21 A. I wish I could remember this one kid's name, but I 22 can't. 23 Q. Was (an) one of them? 24 A. (an) That's the one I would love to 25 remember. 31. 1 (Recess.) 2 MR. CODINHA: Back on the record. 3 BY MR. CODINHA: 4 Q. I believe.when we broke you were talking about who 5 some of the staff were. We talked about you had Pat Hurt 6 you had brought on board. You had (an) there. Do 7 you remember any of the other staff? 8 A. I'm sorry, I can't remember. 9 Q. With respect to when you first took on this 10 responsibility from General Tighe, had you known General 11 Tighe prior to that? 12 A. I did not know General Tighe prior to July of 13 1979. He was Air Force. I was Navy. I had no relationship 14 with the intelligence community. In fact, General Tighe did 15 not want me to come to DIA because I had never had any 16 experience in intelligence. This became a very contentious 17 issue between the Navy and DIA until they allegedly said, 18 well, you either take Tuttle or you don't get anybody. 19 His esteem for sailors was not all that great 20 because at that time the Navy, when you were selected for 21 flag, put on two stars, and, of course, we got what they 22 call frocked, which means once you're selected and went into 23 a flag billet you were able to wear the uniform, i.e., two 24 stars, in my case, when the other services did not practice 25 frocking and when they did make their number they only had 32. 1 one star. Well, some of the one stars were far senior to me 2 and I was running around there with two stars and knew 3 nothing about intelligence. 4 But we built up great chemistry and great respect 5 for each other in very short order. So I almost feel it's a 6 compliment that he should tap me two months or less than two 7 months maybe into the job, that he should select me to head 8 up this what he knew was going to become a very dynamic 9 action. 10 Q. When General Tighe met with you to ask you to take 11 on this responsibility, was it a request or an order? 12 A. It was an order. Well, you know, a senior's 13 meekest desire is my command, and how it was put to me, how 14 emphatically, I don't know. 15 Q. And you indicated a willingness to accept the 16 responsibility? 17 A. I had no choice. 18 Q. And you did take on responsibility? 19 A. By all means. 20 Q. When you did that, did you have a discussion with 21 General Tighe as to what you were supposed to be doing 22 besides the Brooks report? 23 A. Not really, not really. 24 Q. Did you have any discussion with General Tighe at 25 that time, when you first took over the responsibility, as 33. 1 to what you were looking for? Were you just looking for 2 bodies, or were you looking for live people? 3 A. At that time, quite frankly, my most immediate was 4 looking for anybody that knew anything about POW, that had 5 run onto any of these boat people that may have information 6 about, at that time, live Americans. The fact of the 7 remains was unknown at that time. Immediately though -- and 8 this is very important -- it immediately became the fact 9 that we had found this mortician that brought the issue up 10 now. 11 We went from nothing, you know, to 426 remains. 12 Then he passed the polygraph, so now we had -- you know, it 13 was both a blessing -- not a blessing because it showed that 14 we were moving. We did something and there was at least 426 15 perhaps we were going to be able to account for out of 3,000 16 or whatever it was in numbers, which would reduce the 17 sample, if you care. So there was both hope and despair. 18 Q. Putting the remains issue aside for the moment, 19 what were you told by General Tighe, if anything, about live 20 Americans in Indochina? 21 A. In August I was told nothing. 22 Q. When you met with your staff, in this case 23 Trowbridge, what, if anything, were you told by Trowbridge 24 about live Americans in Indochina? 25 A. In August I would guess nothing. Later on, when 34. 1 we started pulling an investigation and started asking 2 questions, then we were told that, you know, back under 3 Specter so-and-so aircraft there had been intercepts that 4 they had been on the ground for three or four days and we 5 were shown a hand-held picture that was allegedly a picture 6 of POW -- it was a Caucasian -- in the cave up there in 7 northeast Laos. I can,t remember where those sites were. 8 And then a few reported sightings of some 9 missionaries and others that we equated to Garwood. But 10 that there were only isolated reports, but nothing. That 11 was very sporadic. 12 Q. Were you told anything when you took over-your 13 position under General Tighe's direction that there was a 14 belief that there were still live Americans in Indochina? 15 A. No, I was told nothing that way, no. 16 Q. Did you deduce, after you had been in the position 17 for some time -- strike that. After a short period of time, 18 were you able to deduce what the opinion of your staff was 19 as to whether there were living Americans in Indochina in 20 the '79 time frame? 21 A. I would have to think that I more than any other 22 person on the staff entertained the idea of the 23 possibilities of live Americans. 24 Q. You would have been early on in this 1979 time 25 frame -- we're talking probably August to December. What 35. 1 would it have been during that time frame that led you to 2 entertain the possibilities of live Americans? 3 A. I don't think during that time that I did believe 4 that there was live Americans there, but I believed the 5 possibilities. In other words, I started. The more I got 6 into it -- and I think it was during this time -- I could 7 make this rough generality of analysis. I started thinking 8 that there had never been an amputee returned. I came to 9 the conclusion that no one had ever been debriefed on 10 nuclear weapons, when in fact Red McDaniels, who was a POW, 11 had been tortured because his squadron happened to be the 12 first introduction (data) 13 So if they were that concerned and that attuned to 14 the conventional weapons, why didn't anyone ever be 15 interrogated about nuclear weapons? I could never find any 16 POW that had been interrogated by a Soviet. For some reason 17 -- how I knew this -- we, whoever we were, knew that there 18 were Soviet interrogators that had been in Vietnam. 19 So I just kept challenging the system, and I would 20 believe every report until I could dispute it, concretely 21 dispute it. I would just not dispute it out of -- I just 22 would not automatically discount it. So I built up a big 23 backlog. And we found some that were nefariously reported, 24 reports put in for whatever reason. 25 So what time it is, what juncture, when did I ever 36. I start feeling that live -- one of the distinct possibilities 2 was early on, and I'll share this, I suppose, with you, as 3 there had been a Vietnamese that had been at Thon Sun.Nhut, 4 and he had been (data), and he had received a 5 (data) , along with two others. 6 And he had reported -- he had been relocated and 7 was- in southern (data) in a refugee camp -- and he had 8 reportedly been taken up southwest of Hanoi, and I forget 9 the cluster of POW camps up there, and had been detained 10 there for a couple of years and brought back and had been in 11 the Ho Chi Minh City area, Saigon. And he reported seeing 12 25 to 30 live Americans 60 kilometers northwest of Saigon. 13 Well, we had the picture of the gentleman. He was 14 -- so I sent (data) , a polygrapher and an interpreter to 15 southern (data) , and they came back -- because he refused to 16 take the polygraph, and they made a big thing out of this. 17 I thought, well, I put myself in his shoes. I would not 18 take a polygraph for another foreign country if someone is 19 doubting my integrity. 20 So I felt personally that they had butchered it, 21 that they did not probably treat -- I do not know this as a 22 fact that they did not -- but I felt in my own mind that 23 they probably had been too crude and did not recognize the 24 sensitivity of a military man, perhaps, of how seriously we 25 feel about integrity. 37. 1 so I sent another group over and again he refused 2 to take the thing. But I started believing this guy, for 3 whatever reason, that the possibilities of the thing could 4 be. 5 (data) 6 (data) 7 (data) 8 (data) 9 10 11 I never did meet the individual. 12 But they had these (data) 13 (data) let me 14 say the spring (data) . Didn't say what 15 country. (data) and I never met 16 them. (data) 17 (data) 18 19 (data) 20 (data) 21 22 23 So this was just an aside of many other things. 24 So the other thing that started -- well, I was 25 motivated because it was my job; I'm motivated on all my 38. 1 jobs -- but the other thing was there was an issue here. 2 When I flew over there, I had always felt if I got bagged or 3 if I was a prisoner that my country would come get me. And 4 we needed to come clean with this country, who commits other 5 people in all future wars, that they have total confidence 6 that we would come get them, within reason. You don't go in 7 and commit suicide to extract. I have been faced with those 8 many times. 9 So I figured, if they were there, I wanted to find 10 them. 11 Q. Let me go back over what you just told me. The 12 (data) 13 (data) 14 15 Were they related in some way? 16 (data) 17 (data) 18 19 20 Q. Was that -- 21 A. (data) 22 Q. Was his name (name) 23 A. That's it. (name) 24 Q. And what did you understand (names) role to 25 be? 39. 1 A. All he was was an intermediary. He sat with me 2 like you are right now, (data) 3 4 (data) and I think it was this refugee; could have 5 been something else, but I don't think so -- and we went 6 back and forth to be able to (data) 7 (data) 8 (Data) I quite frankly forgot what it is. It's something 9 like three issues. What do you (data) . 10 (data) 11 (data) 12 13 (name) (data) 14 (data) 15 Q. Why was it (data) ? 16 A. Well, the fact that (data) 17 (data) 18 (data) 19 (data) 20 Q. And (Name) (Data) during this period ? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. So he would work with you? 23 A. All he was was available to me, and he said if I 24 ever could help you. I don't know (data) 25 , but this one here was one that I happened to know 40. 1 because there was a funding issue. I found out that some 2 service was supporting it and the other two services thought 3 it was a bunch of malarkey -- I forget even what service it 4 was -- but we tried it on this one time to get these. 5 results, and that somewhat reinforced this refugee. 6 Q. Do you remember what that program was called? 7 A. I don't know if I ever knew. 8 Going back now to what we initially started in 9 with when you took over this role from General Tighe, you 10 said you had an analysis team and you moved them from 11 Arlington to the Pentagon. 12 A. Yes, sir. 13 Q. How many people were involved? 14 A. I think there was eight people at that time. 15 And that would have been Trowbridge, (name) and 16 six others? 17 A. Yes, sir. 18 Q. So the eight would not have included you? 19 A. No, no. It didn't include me, and it did not 20 include Pat Hurt. I brought him in later. 21 Q. What time period did you bring Pat Hurt in? 22 A. I frankly can't recall. 23 Q. We'll talk to Hurt and find out. 24 A. I just can't remember. 25 Q. You also stated that you tried to do better 41. 1 analytical work. What was the problem with the analytical 2 work that you saw when you came on? 3 A. I felt it had fallen into lethargy, that they were 4 starting to paraphrase what had been done before. And I 5 think that there might have been -- and I don't say this 6 overly critically -- they were trying -- that they had 7 become convinced or the country had become convinced that 8 there were no more, so they, without doing any refresh or 9 challenging analysis, whatever it is, they would be able to 10 explain it away. 11 Q. When you took your role on, did you go back to do 12 reanalysis of the work they had done? 13 A. Some of it I did when it was brought to my 14 attention, but a lot of it came up, like Specter 17 I recall 15 was an infamous one. And the League was able to bring this 16 into focus real fast because some of these were infamous, 17 and George Brooks and others had analyzed these things And 18 said what about this. 19 So we went on those and we built up case folders 20 on these things. In fact, we started sending people. I'd 21 give them to the Vietnamese to ask them, and I forgot-what 22 the numbers were -- let me say five or six -- in the package 23 which were the more concrete information we had on it, to 24 give them to the Vietnamese to see if they were able to do 25 anything about them. 42. 1 This crash site, do you know anything about tbat, 2 or even on the POWs, as I recall, Hall was the last POW. He 3 was alive on the ground. And, of course, he never came 4 back. In fact, I'm not even sure if we ever got his 5 remains. So things that we knew occurred, those were the 6 ones we focused on, if we had enough intelligence. 7 Q. Who was your immediate subordinate on POW matters 8 at DIA? Was it Trowbridge? 9 A. Trowbridge. 10 Q. What was your relationship with Trowbridge? 11 A. It was -- I became exasperated with him, quite 12 frankly. He's a nice guy, a hell of a nice guy. 13 Q. He was Navy, as I recall. 14 A. Yes, he was. Remember, I said he was either a 15 commander or a retired commander. I don't know if he was 16 both during that time -- he was a commander when I got there 17 wearing civilian clothes or he was a retired commander 18 wearing civilian clothes or what. I don't recall. I'm 19 really blind to rank. I just don't concern myself with it. 20 (data) 21 Q. What did you see about him that led you to that 22 conclusion? 23 A. Just I don't think (data) . I don't 24 mean that demeaning at all. He's a super guy, a nice 25 individual, and I think he meant well. I don't think 43. 1 there's a nefarious bone in that gentleman's body. And he 2 is a gentleman. But I just don't think (data) 3 (data) . He's not dumb, or he wouldn't have 4 been a commander. 5 Q. What did you think of his analytical skills, if 6 any? 7 A. Most of his was supervisory as opposed to 8 analytical skills. In fact, I don't know if he was -- he 9 was a line officer, like I was. I think he was a regular 10 line officer. I don't think he had a subspecialty in 11 intelligence. He may have. I don't know that. 12 Q. What was the chain of command or the line of 13 command between you and the analytical section, the actual 14 analysts? 15 A. Well, they worked for Trowbridge, of course. That 16 was the most immediate thing. But I have to admit I became 17 very much hands on with the different analysts, and I would 18 walk right down there and talk to them about their 19 specifics. I quite frankly forgot how I had it profiled. I 20 finally broke them up into different subsets, you know, to 21 where they could focus in so they wouldn't be working -- so 22 people could focus in on different -- and I'm very impatient 23 so I probably had them bumping around more than what they 24 were accustomed to doing. 25 I would personally go down and ask them specifics 44. 1 on different cases, and at that time I used to be able to 2 retain a lot of that in my head, and ask them very pointed 3 questions, getting in where I was not qualified. I'm not 4 an analyst in any stretch of the imagination, but I kept 5 asking the whys, the whys, the whys, ad nauseam. 6 And then when I found out something we didn't 7 know, I was very proactive. 8 Q. When an analyst would complete an analysis on a 9 case file, would it have to be presented to you for 10 approval? 11 A. Many of them were. Most of them were, and I 12 would critically analyze them and disagree with many of 13 them. I can remember being very disturbed about the 14 gentleman over there that ended up in the refugee camp. I 15 just thought that -- I would always try to put myself into 16 the individuals shoes. 17 Q. Into the reportee or the reporter? 18 A. Both. I tried to live the scenario and how it 19 was presented. I even also was able to get a Vietnamese 20 to come to work for me for about a month or six weeks -- I 21 can't recall the time frame -- just to make sure that I 22 understood their culture and how to -- to make sure our 23 staff was -- different people have different 24 sensitivities, and I did not know how the orientals 25 worked. 45. 1 So we knew how to couch questions. In fact, 2 that's how we started training our polygraphers, because 3 you've got to know the culture, you've got to know the 4 sensitivities. Different words mean different things 5 And that's where Pat Hurt picked up. He was not a 6 polygrapher at that time. He later became one. 7 Q. Prior to you setting up these new teams with an 8 analyst, a polygrapher, and a translator, how had the 9 teams been set up, if they had even used teams? 10 A. I don't think they had teams. 11 Q. Had they used polygraphers prior? 12 A. No, they did not. Matter of fact, General 13 Stilwell, who had relieved -- or maybe it had been Dan 14 Murphy, one of the two -- I went to them -- who was up on 15 OSD staff to use a polygraph. In fact, I was the first 16 one in DOD, other than the security out at NSA, to use 17 polygraphers. 18 And then it became the fashionable thing, after 19 the Walker-Walker-Wentworth. In fact, even after I used 20 them and set up the criteria, because that was another 21 thing I had to do on the side, was to convince the system 22 of the value of polygraphs. And I did that right off on 23 the Chinese gentleman. So I had to get authorization to 24 use it, and then once we found out -- and there was some 25 professor in Utah that had written all these books and 46. 1 everything to show the value, and if you had a good 2 operator -- and I ended up getting the best to do this 3 it was a very valid instrument, a very valuable tool to 4 use. 5 So then it grew upon that, and now it's 6 accepted. In fact, it's accepted in something like 30 or 7 40 of the states now as admissible in law. You know that 8 better than I do. 9 Q. On what did you base your faith in the 10 polygraph, because clearly you must have had faith in it 11 to use it. 12 A. I read. I read books, and I read the testimony, 13 Congressional testimony, about -- I got the articles 14 written by experts and the polygrapher I got was the 15 gentleman that had represented the husband who shot the 16 lover in the famous case in Dallas. That's the 17 polygrapher, and I forget his name. Edwards, as I recall. 18 But he was supposed to be the world's best, and so I was 19 able to get him. 20 Q. What were the standards you applied for these 21 teams that went out? For instance, if someone went out 22 and took a statement -- the translator and the analyst 23 and a polygraph were given and the individual passed the 24 polygraph, what indicia went onto that report to indicate 25 that you felt it was reliable? Would that go in a special 47. 1 category? 2 A. Well, I'd review a lot, but not all of them, 3 because there were so many going on at the time. But let 4 me use the first one we took, the mortician, because I 5 knew that the polygraph would be challenged. So when we 6 turned him over to the INS, I arranged to have another 7 trustee put in the room with him to determine if he had 8 been deceitful. It was probing, and he was apparently 9 telling the truth. 10 This was before we wove him into society so he 11 wouldn't get bagged. 12 Q. So he wouldn't -- 13 A. Any retribution be taken against him. 14 Q. At what level did we stop raising the high jump 15 hurdle, as it were? After one polygraph, after two 16 polygraphs? At what level did somebody become 17 trustworthy? 18 A. Well, I think it was accepted that the Mortician 19 -- I don't think anybody doubts that. No one ever 20 challenged because they were remains. He also pointed out 21 that he had seen three live Americans, quasi-free, in 22 Hanoi in bars. I don't recall that we polygraphed him on 23 that, frankly, because they were not in chains or that 24 bit. And there was more of an emergency to find out more 25 about, at that time, the remains. 48. 1 Q. I'm just wondering if there were guidelines, for 2 instance, that you told your analytical teams, that if you 3 go out and talk to the individual and you find him 4 trustworthy, and he passes a polygraph, and his story 5 seems to check out, and then we give him another polygraph 6 and he passes that one, at what point can we say we accept 7 that story? The mortician is a good example because he 8 got accepted. 9 A. That's right. 10 Q. Now the mortician does speak of live Americans. 11 A. Yes, he does. But I was too ignorant to even 12 give demands on him. 13 Q. So is what you're telling me that there was no 14 uniform standard applied between analytical teams? 15 A. On polygraphs, because polygraphs were just 16 introduced. 17 Q. Who was the ultimate decisionmaker as to whether 18 an IR, incident report, of a live sighting would be 19 considered credible or not credible? 20 A. Perhaps me. 21 Q. Did you do anything with these investigatory 22 reports when you got them, or did you file them in your 23 desk so you could review them? 24 A. It was a dynamic interaction. It was ongoing 25 all the time. In other words, I didn't wait for any 49. 1 reports. I never did sit down -- well, I did sit down and 2 read and try to critically analyze it, but all these 3 cases, when we got into them, were living. You lived 4 them. Daily do this, do this, do this. Well, how does 5 this stack up? 6 And you start challenging. I can't remember. 7 There was a few of them we dismissed when we had enough 8 proving information that they were whatever, or many of 9 them led to Garwood. But I can't remember any of them 10 that we ever closed. I never closed anything. As far as 11 I was concerned, they were always open. There might have 12 been some of them that we positively identified as false. 13 Q. So as far as you were concerned, during the time 14 period you were there, all of these reports remained open. 15 A. For the most part. We had them broken up, as I 16 can remember, in categories -- live sighting reports, 17 remains. 18 Q. Secondhand? 19 A. Secondhand. That's exactly right. I forgot how 20 I profiled it, but we started breaking them up so they 21 were in manageable ones and put them in priority orders 22 quite frankly, and that's how we did it. 23 Q. When you came into DIA, was there a list of 24 people that you had as possible Americans still in 25 Vietnam? 50. 1 A. Well, when I got into it -- I was in DIA before 2 I ever got into the POW issue. 3 Q. I'm asking really when you were in the POW 4 issue. 5 A. When I got the POW shop, there were stories, but 6 they were fragmented, as to, you know -- and I would get 7 this from the National League, frankly, as I recall -- 8 what about Hall, what about Shelton, what about-these 9 people. We had nothing out of Laos. Laos was a complete 10 dark hole at the time. 585 -- 11 Q. Shootdowns? 12 A. Shootdowns or something like that. Anyway, so 13 as far as having a list, a discrepancy list, codified, I 14 don't recall having one. We did one after that to find 15 out, whether it be the 3 from Specter or whatever the case 16 may be. 17 Q. So you began to develop a list while you were 18 there? 19 A. Yes. We started building a store, if you care, 20 and dicing it every way that I was capable of doing. 21 Q. Is it accurate, then, to say that from 1973, 22 when Homecoming ended, April of '73, until you came in in 23 '79, you were unaware of whether there was any list of 24 POWs? 25 A. I was unaware of that. I'm sure the League 51. 1 would have had an ad hoc one, but that's conjecture. I 2 don't know. What went on between '73 and August of '79, I 3 didn't dwell on it too much. 4 Q. Okay. I guess -- and you're going to have to 5 help me through this -- I'm curious why when you came in 6 and you begin seeing these incident reports of live 7 Americans, a query isn't made by you to Trowbridge or 8 somebody, saying hey, there's a lot of reports. Who could 9 these people be? Do we have a list? 10 A. Oh, well, possibility candidates, sure. 11 Clearly. Oh, by all means. 12 Q. And who did you use as the list of possibility 13 candidates? 14 A. Well, we'd take the blacks listed in southern 15 Vietnam or the black that's in Laos who has a Lao wife. 16 We had candidates on that, sure, by either geography. 17 Q. So there was -- 18 A. There was access to other reports or whatever 19 information that could lead to some possibility. 20 Candidates, yes. 21 Q. Did you ever have something that would have been 22 called last known alive in captivity to list the people 23 who were last known alive in captivity who didn't come 24 back at Homecoming? 25 A. We finally developed -- there was three people. 52. 1 Now all of them came out from the debrief of the POWs, the 2 returnees, and none of them listed any. Don't hold me to 3 the accuracy of this, but somehow there was Congressional 4 interest on some remains in Saigon after the fall that was 5 in the hospital. 6 Q. That's Senator Kennedy asking for the two 7 Marines who are at the Baptist Hospital? 8 A. That's the story. So you know as much about it 9 as I do. But there was three, the mortician said that he 10 went there. So there was always there was a discrepancy. 11 I thought it was asked for one. 12 Q. He asked for two, and they didn't ask for the 13 black remains. 14 A. You've got the story. You have it more 15 faithfully than I do. So that was the only one that came 16 up after the fact, that there was a live American still 17 there when the POWs came out or evacuation. So, as a 18 matter of fact, if you talk to the POWs, they'll tell you 19 that if they didn't enter their system, he wasn't there. 20 The big convert, of course, on this very issue 21 is Red McDaniels. Red McDaniels was the OLA, and I 22 brought him over and gave him the brief, and, man, he 23 became a convert overnight. Then he was convinced that 24 there were Americans left behind, but he didn't have any 25 -- 53. 1 Q. He became a convert to whom? To you? 2 A. No, no. 3 Q. I missed something. 4 A. When he was a POW and came out, he was convinced 5 that no live Americans were left behind because they were 6 not in the POW system, whatever the system entailed. 7 Because of his being an office of legislative affairs, 8 Navy, and because I was briefing quite frequently 9 Congressmen, some Senators, I brought him in as a courtesy 10 to brief him on what I was doing and what intelligence we 11 had. 12 At that time, he became very reoriented, at 13 least. Whether he was a believer at that time that there 14 were live Americans, I don't know. I think he's convinced 15 there are now. So what I'm saying is, the point I was 16 trying to make there, is there was a POW that had one 17 mindset, that there were no others, who, for whatever 18 reason, justified or not, completly converted to believing 19 that there are live Americans in southeast Asia. 20 Q. Can you describe to the best of your 21 recollection the organization of the POW/MIA section that 22 you were in charge of? You were in charge. You were, 23 reporting to -- 24 A. The Deputy to DIA, Kellm, if I got that job 25 while I was in plans and policies. If I had already been 54. 1 reorganized, I'd be reporting to John Hughes, who in turn 2 reported to the Deputy at DIA. 3 Q. Did Tighe remain in the position he'd been in at 4 DIA? 5 A. Tighe was there when I got there and I think he 6 was there -- yes, he was there when I left. 7 Q. So they were reporting to Tighe? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Within DIA, who did you rely on the most, if you 10 relied on anyone, as your most reliable and knowledgeable 11 advisor on POW intelligence matters? 12 A. I didn't. I just run it myself. 13 Q. Was there a reason you didn't look to anybody in 14 DIA? 15 A. Oh, I asked (name) and special items I'd ask for 16 assistance, but not really. 17 Q. How involved was General Tighe in monitoring 18 POW/MIA intelligence during your tenure? 19 A. I'd say quite active. In fact, he was quite 20 interested in it, frankly. 21 Q. What does that mean on a day-to-day or week-to- 22 week basis? How often would you interact with General 23 Tighe on this? 24 A. Daily. 25 Q. For how long a time? Just to give him 2- 55. 1 minute report? 2 A. Well, first of all, we went to the morning 3 meetings and I saw him, unless I was on travel, but if I 4 was in the DIA I went to the morning stand-up and 5 interacted, and I would say that POW/MIA was by far and 6 away the most active part of my tour in DIA, and so 7 whatever interexchange we had -- rhetorical questions, how 8 things going and that -- and then he would call me on 9 specific questions. 10 Q. Did he regularly do that? 11 A. Yes, I think so, yes. 12 Q. What was your opinion of General Tighe's 13 involvement in the POW/MIA issue? 14 A. Well, I was very grateful. He let me run it. 15 He was very much interested. He gave me total support, 16 and I think he had trust and confidence in me. I think he 17 showed a great degree of interest. In that regard, I 18 couldn't have asked for more support. I could not have 19 asked for more interest, nor could I ask for a freer hand 20 in running it. 21 Q. During your time period, while you were in 22 charge of the POW/MIA operation, as you've described it, 23 did General Tighe opine to you that he believed that there 24 were living Americans still being held in Indochina? 25 A. I can't recall if he did. I think at that time 56. 1 all the information he was getting was from me. He may 2 have been getting some from other sources unknown to me. 3 Until the day I left, until the day I was 4 ?????????? I thought there was live Americans, 5 6 (lines 5 through 9 are blank here) 7 8 9 10 Q. You jumped to the next question I wanted to ask, 11 but the earlier question was what about Tighe. Did Tighe 12 share with you his opinion as to whether there were living 13 Americans being held in Indochina? 14 A. I frankly cannot recall. 15 Q. Would you remember something like that if he had 16 shared it with you? 17 A. I'm not sure. As emphatically as you are 18 saying. In other words, I can go up there and brief him 19 on this. Clearly he was totally aboard on what I was 20 briefing to the Chiefs, but for him to come out and 21 emphatically say that there's live Americans, I don't 22 recall him ever saying that. 23 I heard him say subsequently publicly that he 24 felt they were there. 25 Q. Have you been in contact with General T@ghe 57. 1 since you left your position? 2 A. I've seen him several times, yes, sir, and I 3 understand he's not in good health now, so I should call 4 him, frankly. 5 Q. Has he shared with you since that time his basis 6 of believing there were still Americans left in Indochina? 7 A. No. Since I left DIA, we never talked anything 8 professionally, only personally. I have a lot of 9 admiration for the man. He's forgot more about 10 intelligence than I'd ever know. 11 Q. In terms of personal veracity, truthfulness, did 12 you find General Tighe to be a truthful man? 13 A. Oh, I never questioned his integrity never. 14 I'd have to have a lot of evidence before I doubt anyone's 15 integrity because that's -- 16 Q. I'm not imputing -- 17 A. I understand. 18 Q. I'm asking the question. 19 A. From my orientation, everybody's honest until 20 proven guilty, and particularly General Tighe. 21 Q. And you saw nothing during your experience when 22 you worked for General Tighe that led you to believe that 23 his credibility or truth and veracity should be doubted? 24 A. None whatsoever. 25 Q. Was it considered a normal responsibility for 58. 1 you in your job capacity at DIA to brief policymakers and 2 military leaders on current intelligence issues of 3 importance? 4 A. Primarily POW/MIA. I did it quite extensively. 5 Q. And how would that happen? You clearly briefed 6 Tighe, who was your superior, but -- 7 A. Well, we'd get requests. 8 Q. And policymakers and military leaders, would 9 that be other services that would ask for this? 10 A. Primarily the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Armitage 11 on OSD. 12 Q. Armitage we probably can spell, but why don't 13 you just spell it? 14 A. A-r-m-i-t-a-g-e. He's did the negotiations for 15 the Philippines basin. 16 Q. And you said he was OSD? 17 A. He was up there at ISA or something like that. 18 MR. TAYLOR: Assistant Secretary for 19 International Affairs. 20 BY MR. CODINHA: 21 Q. What did you understand his role to be? 22 A. He was wanting to know what intelligence I had. 23 I'd go and talk to him. Also, there was a great degree of 24 interest. I might hasten to add that what, Richards over 25 on the NSC staff, the retired admiral that was on the NSC 59. 1 staff became quite interested and I used to brief him 2 quite frequently. It's in this report here. 3 MR. TAYLOR: Bud Nance? 4 THE WITNESS: Nance was the admiral. Who was he 5 working for? 6 MR. TAYLOR: Richard Allen? 7 THE WITNESS: Yes, Richard Allen. And they 8 became very interested 9 BY MR. CODINHA: 10 Q. On particularly sensitive or important 11 intelligence subjects, was it more likely that you would 12 do the briefing or General Tighe would personally brief 13 the Joint Chiefs? 14 A. Oh, I would. 15 Q. The reason for that was you were more hands on, 16 day to day? 17 A. Yes, there's no way he could. I was totally 18 involved in it and, of course, he had the whole agency to 19 run. 20 Q. Would Trowbridge be involved in that sort of 21 briefing? 22 A. No. 23 Q. And was that because it really required a flag 24 level person? 25 A. No. I was more familiar with it.. 60. 1 Q. You were more familiar than Trowbridge was? 2 A. Oh, clearly. In other words, I briefed flag 3 officers and I briefed myself. I also don't have 4 everybody else do my work. In other words, I also want to 5 keep it on the proper level. I also want to make sure 6 that the words are couched in the right terms. This is a 7 very delicate balance, and I don't want to be accused of 8 leading or giving wrong -- I did not want to sell 9 anything. I wanted to couch it in very objective terms as 10 far as possible and not to incite or not to -- I wanted to 11 have a level playing field at all times. 12 Q. You made a statement, I believe, earlier today, 13 in which you said when you left your role at DIA and the 14 POW/MIA shop you believed that there were still Americans 15 left in Indochina, living Americans. 16 17 18 Q. Did you believe that there were live Americans 19 20 A. I believed it, 21 Q. Starting in August of '79, you came in, as it 22 were, tabula rasa. You were a blank slate. 23 A. Yes. 24 Q. At what point did you become convinced that 25 there were living Americans still held in Indochina? 61. 1 A. Well, not convinced. That's the first time, if 2 you want the intermediate time, the first time that I 3 become convinced that the possibility existed was this 4 refugee that I was telling you about, the (data) 5 (data), that had been in the security force at Than Sun 6 Nhut. I started believing his story. 7 Q. What period of time would that have been? If 8 you started in August of '79, are you able to help us pin 9 some time frame on that? 10 A. This is strictly a guess. I would say around 11 April of '80. 12 Q. Okay. 13 A. That's a guess. 14 Q. That would have been after the mortician had 15 surfaced? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. And the mortician was giving testimony -- 18 A. He did it in August '79. 19 Q. In Congress. Do you recall that? 20 A. Yes. He came back, and I don't know what the 21 hiatus was between the time that he made the reports and 22 the time he came back to testify before Congress. I just 23 can't recall. It would be in the record. 24 Q. When did you first become aware of intelligence 25 indicating that American POWs might still be held captive 62. 1 in Laos? 2 A. Well, we had reports when I took over the job. 3 Remember I told you the handheld photography in the cave? 4 I can't recall those caves up there. Forgive me. And 5 then we had reported (mt) . I can't for the life of 6 me recall how we got these reported (mt) that, first 7 of all, there had been reports of (mt) long before, 8 when they were shot down. I can't recall what the sources 9 were. They had reports that they were tromping through 10 the jungles and all this in Laos. 11 Then I started focusing on Laos, and I can't 12 recall the sequence of events, but I went out to NSA to, 13 meet. 14 Q. Who did you meet with at NSA? 15 A. Some lady. She was the analyst. And they had a 16 charge d'affaires here, because we did not have 17 diplomatic, and that's how we started developing that, so 18 she could explain to me the demeanor of this individual 19 and how excited he was. 20 Q. Was that Barbara McNamara? 21 A. I've heard that name before, but it could have 22 been you have invited my attention to that in our 23 discussion. Barbara McNamara does ring a bell. She was 24 incredibly professional, because we had a (mt) 25 (mt) 63. 1 And then there was a series of reports, and I 2 don't know the sequence, but I started studying Laos, and 3 then I also started developing a pattern. Every one of 4 their provinces or counties or whatever they call them had 5 a prison that was, for the most part, centrally located in 6 that province. And I, for some reason or another, was 7 homing in on a place called Attapeu. As I recall, it was a 8 a province -- as a matter of fact, I think there was a 9 province called Attapeu, which never did prove out. 10 But then that was when I started looking at this 11 thing and I said, well, every one of them has, for the 12 most part, a prison. And then we heard -- and I don't 13 know what the sequence of events on this was -- we 14 reportedly -- by reportedly, 15 that there had been three POWs moved down to this cave in 16 ??????????? and had been taken down there by truck. 17 Then they had been reported to be out sunning, and one of 18 them was a Japanese engineer and the other two were 19 Americans. 20 And then that's why I used this title 21 ????????? because it was within, I think, some 16 miles 22 of where this camp is, because we could put the people in 23 the general area, but we never compromised the exact 24 location of the camp. 25 64. 1 There was all kinds of stories from refugees and 2 reconnaissance missions put in there, and they had started- 3 out with an American and they'd get ambushed and all this, 4 and nothing that I could substantiate, but one of the 5 gentlemen that was reported to be killed in a refugee 6 report, then it came in through reported intercepts -- I 7 don't remember what form I got them in or it was told -- 8 9 (lines 8 through 15 are completely blank) 10 11 12 ????????????????? 13 14 15 16 different groups, dissident groups, clashing all around 17 there. 18 Q. I'd like to just stop you here because you've 19 given me a lot of information. If I understand correctly, 20 at some time after you took over in your position in the 21 POW/MIA shop, you began looking at Laos. That's right, 22 isn't it? 23 A. Yes. And I hasten to add that it was not 24 immediately, because it had always been a black hole and 25 there had been nothing out of there. And, as it ended up 65. 1 it became one of our at least activity most fruitful. 2 Q. So that happened at some time between August of-- 3 '79 and 4 A. Yes. 5 Q. Can you help me when you began to focus in on 6 that? 7 A. When I began to focus in on that? 8 Q. 9 (Again lines 9 through 14 are totally blank) 10 11 12 13 14 15 So then it looked like we started -- the charge 16 -- I forgot his name -- at Vientiane became more active in 17 it, and he was very sympathetic. In fact, he came back 18 here and went to the National League of Families. So he 19 became more of an awareness on his part. And I don't know 20 what the chronology of this is. These are just spots and 21 I'm coming around. 22 So all of a sudden I started seeing cracks, and, 23 quite frankly, started focusing on Laos, not to the 24 exclusion of Vietnam but I think the atmosphere had been 25 it was closed and we hadn't gotten anything out of there, 66. 1 so why bother. Well, I started finding cracks in it. 2 And there's another thing that occurred if I 3 may. See, most of them were coming out on boats, 4 initially, refugees coming out by boats. Then some of the 5 refugees had said they had come across the overland route. 6 Some of the analysts said that's ridiculous. They would 7 never have been able to do that. And yet in retrospect we 8 know that that year something like 30 percent of them had 9 come out over the overland railroad -- the railroad people 10 over land, about 30 percent of them, because it was 11 actually safer than by the boats. 12 Q. Was that one way in which the analysts were able 13 to disregard reports by them? 14 A. Well, initially they were doing the disregard. 15 We never, ever -- first of all, when I say disregard, we 16 never, ever threw any of them away, so we could go back 17 for whatever reason. But initially they could not believe 18 that they would be that desperate or try something that 19 daring, to come out through Laos and Cambodia. They just 20 didn't believe that they would attempt that. 21 Remember, the Khmer Rouge was very active at 22 this time down there also. And that border between 23 Thailand and Cambodia, that was wild. 24 Q. Now prior 25 during the period when you began focusing on Laos, you 67. 1 described to me a picture of what appeared to be a 2 Caucasian, a prisoner in a cave. 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. And I thought you said you also had report 5 (mt) dealing with individuals in Laos. 6 A. There had been reports way back when, when they 7 first went down, when the accident had occurred, of 8 (mt) that were in the files. 9 Q. Now I'm interested after Homecoming, after April 10 of '73, and until the time you're talking about, did you 11 see any information or (mt) , 12 that you saw (mt) of live POWs? 13 A. There were reports that were presented to me, 14 from what source -- allegedly (mt) -- 15 16 17 Q. 18 want to see if there are any between Homecoming 19 20 A. Yes. There was allegedly an (mt) reported 21 to me of where they moved one or more from a concentration 22 camp in northeast Laos to another concentration camp 23 24 Q. Can you recall when that was? 25 A. Well, it was before December or November of '80 68. 1 ??????????????????????? See, 2 that's why I went around ??????????????????????????? 3 ??????????? of these different camps. I think 4 4 December hits my mind ??????????????????? And then we 5 started regressing back on these shots, any that we 6 happened to have, of this area, from whatever satellite 7 source, so it had to have been before that because I had 8 already focused in through this other analyst that caused 9 me to focus on these other areas. 10 Q. Again I want to focus on the (MT) . Were 11 these what is called in the trade ??????????????????????? 12 A. ???????????????????????? blank here 13 Q. What do you understand ?????? to be? 14 A. ???????????????/ 15 Q. How do you understand that differs from (?) ? 16 A. Signal intelligence is ???????????????? 17 ?????? , I'm not a purist on it, but it's a ???????????????? 18 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 19 Q. And the ?????????????????????????????? 20 A. There you go. 21 (blank line) 22 Q. What I guess I want to know now is was that 23 intelligence reported to you from NSA? 24 A. If it was in fact, it would have come from NSA. 25 I was not told by NSA. I was told this was in analyst 69. 1 reports. 2 Q. So the reporting on that that you saw -- and 3 when I say "on that," ????????????????? was, 4 contained in analyst reports? 5 A. Yes sir. 6 Q. Did you ask the analysts for the source of that 7 information? 8 A. No, because I have to infer that it came from 9 NSA. 10 Q. Was there any other source that you had to get 11 12 A. No, not at this time. 13 Q. Was there any reason that you know that an 14 analyst would put in that he had a ????????????? source 15 if he didn't have it? 16 A. No. 17 Q. So you relied on your analysts for that? 18 A. Sure. I did not go back to raw or even sources 19 on very little. 20 Q. And I ask this. Do you have a specific memory 21 of having seen that information ??????????????????????? 22 ???????????????????????????? on this one or more POWs moved 23 from northeast Laos to another camp? 24 A. I can only remember the event. I can remember 25 the instance. I don't remember what the report was or 70. 1 even in what context. 2 Q. Was there an NSA weekly summary publication? 3 A. I suppose there were. 4 Q. Did you receive those? 5 A. We probably did. 6 Q. Do you recall this information being contained 7 in those? 8 A. I do not. 9 Q. If I wanted to try to follow up on that piece of 10 information, how would I go about doing it? 11 A. Well, undoubtedly they are in the files. 12 (lines 12, 13, & 14 are blank) 13 14 15 reports. And they can't be that voluminous. In other 16 words, we'd have them by incidents, events, but then also 17 compartmented over in Laos. By "compartment," I mean just 18 profiled. 19 So I would think there are any number of those 20 reports in there that should ???????????????????????????? 21 that -- take Attapeu. 22 That time period would be within one or two months. plus 23 24 (where the pages are left blank this exactly how the 25 deposition is.... I will stop putting question marks) 71. 1 Q. ???????????????????? it? 2 A. Yes. ?????????????????????? It is that 3 thing. And that was why I used it to describe the prison 4 or the compound. 5 Q. I see. 6 A. I'm trying to answer your question on how you 7 would home in on this. If you get that, that would get 8 you in the time frame, and then look around there for 9 reports on Laos, and it should pop out. It should not be 10 that big a research. 11 Q. Were there any other ????????????????????? 12 reports that you were aware of besides the one you told me 13 about prior to the ?????????????????? relating to Laos? 14 A. There probably were, but I cannot recall. I'm 15 convinced there were, but I cannot positively say. 16 Q. Relating to POWs? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Live POWs? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Do you recall any ???? that related to live 21 POWs for all of Indochina, not Laos, between 1973, after 22 Homecoming, and the time -- 23 A. other than Laos, I cannot. 24 Q. 25 72. 1 Would you spell that, by the way? 2 A. I could not even start to spell it. I have 3 trouble pronouncing it. 4 5 A. As I was telling, you intelligence were leading 6 me around, including the ???????????????? of the 7 person being brought down moved from one prison to 8 another, and that's when I started homing in on the -- 9 Q. On Laos? 10 A. On Laos. And that's when I started homing in. 11 That's when I said there started showing up a pattern. I 12 also had Attapeu, which is down in the south -- I think 13 again ???????????????????????? that was homing me in on 14 Attapeu, because I don't think -- I probably got some 15 other reports out of there too, but I don't for sure. It 16 might have been ???? for Attapeu. 17 And I saw these were prisons. So then I started 18 looking, taking looks at these prisons (mt) 19 ?????? want to talk to you a little about the 20 prisons before we focus in right here. 21 A. Compounds. 22 Q. When did you first get interested in 23 compounds/prisons? 24 A. From some of this other intelligence that was 25 leading me into it. But I don't know which come first. I 73. 1 do not know which report, whether ????????????????????????? 2 ?????????????? or if it was the movement -- and I had 3 some allegedly HUMINT reports from refugees of different 4 reconnaissance in by different factions, and different 5 reports from these different places. 6 So I started putting them on a map and analyzing 7 the, and that's when I came to the conclusion that each 8 one of these provinces had a compound, a prison, or 9 whatever you want to call it. 10 Q. How did you arrive at that conclusion -- that 11 each one had a prison? 12 A. Because I either had a report or I went and 13 ??????????????? to determine it. 14 Q. This was all prior to the ?????????????????????? 15 A. Yes, sir, it was -- 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 It was during the hostage thing, so -- oh, 25 another report by ?????????? was that they were broadcasting 74. 1 in So I looked at this. Then 2 I went back to see if we had any prior ?????????? n 3 this, and we did. We had seen where the road that used to 4 (4 through 6 are blank) 5 6 7 traveled. 8 And it had all grown up. I looked there and I 9 saw where they cleared a vast amount of forest on this 10 stream. ??????????????????? . And with no apparent 11 labor-saving devices. So they had to have a large, or 12 apparently had to have a large work force to have cleared 13 this amount of timber there. 14 15 (14 through 23 are blank) 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Q. Before I leave and forever forget about my POW 25 move from northeast Laos, to another camp, did we ever 75. 1 follow up on that and try to -- 2 A. Well, we were investigating. Whether they 3 continued to investigate it after I left, I don't know. 4 Q. But, as far as you know, there was never any 5 conclusion to that? 6 A. No, no. It was never -- and I forget. There 7 was some of these Lao that was up around Seattle that 8 actually ended up on television, as I recall, that made 9 reports that they had been in different prisons. 10 Q. What first drew your 11 (blank) 12 A. The cave. 13 Q. The cave. 14 A. A report that they had been taken down there in 15 a truck at night and taken up there. 16 Q. What kind of report? 17 A. ??? report, apparently. An (mt) , an 18 (mt) that they had transported these three people to 19 (blank) 20 Q. And that was the first information you had. 21 You'll just have to walk me through this slowly. 22 A. Well, is that ?????????? of the 23 cave? 24 Q. Let me show you this. Do you recognize what 25 (blank) 76. 1 A 2 3 (2 - 6 blank) 4 5 6 7 localized area. I clearly have seen this before, but what 8 9 (8 - 13 blank) 10 11 12 13 14 A. 26 March. 15 Q. That is just a date. 16 A. Oh, that ???????????? get you. 17 Q. I don't know what that refers to. It's just an 18 identifier for the stenographer. 19 So there was (mt) of three POWs in 20 21 (20 - 25 blank) 22 23 24 25 77. 1 Q. Okay. What did you do with respect to the cave? 2 A. We asked the Japanese, through diplomatic 3 channels, are they missing a Japanese engineer. We 4 started looking, along your line of questioning before, 5 what were some of the candidates. What could they have 6 related to? 7 Q. Do you recall who you reduced it down to? 8 A. I don't think we ever did. Let me push back. 9 Two Caucasians. One was an Aussie, Australian. And 10 another whose father had actually been, reportedly -- I 11 don't know this to be true and I'm really pulling -- had 12 actually come to Washington to see if that could have been 13 his father before we got this report, and had been 14 convinced, reportedly had been convinced that his son was 15 dead. That was a candidate. 16 In other words, we could have equated to a 17 possible Australian and the son of a person who had been 18 subsequently convinced, and they were not associated with 19 the war, to my knowledge. 20 Q. Civilians? 21 A. Civilians, and certainly not military. I don't 22 know whether the Agency could have had them or not, but we 23 concluded that those were the two likely candidates. 24 Q. Admiral, can you assist me in helping me to 25 determine how this would be handled in your office? 78. 1 You've now got ???????? . You are focusing 2 Q. Do you give this to an analysis team? 3 A. Oh, they get it before I do. 4 Q. So an analysis team had looked at this. Which 5 was the analysis team that looked at it? 6 A. Oh, I have no idea. I had an analyst team, and 7 I don't even know what we built up to. We didn't explode, 8 but we built up. They gave us additional resources to do 9 analytical work. 10 Q. So you're ??????????????? and 11 you've got this (mt) and you begin, what, 12 (blank) 13 A. Yes. In fact -- well, I didn't ask for that 14 because, see -- I didn't ask for that, I don't think, 15 unless it was a routine -- 16 Q. The photograph I showed you? 17 A. Yes, 18 19 20 (18 - 24 blank) 21 22 23 24 25 A. On or about 4 December of '80. That's when I 79. 1 ???????????? that excited me on a possibility. 2 (2-4 blank) 3 4 Q. Are you the one ??????????????????????????????? 5 A. I don't even know. I really don't know. 6 really don't know. I probably was not. 7 Q. So you saw ???????????????????????? 8 and then what did you do? 9 10 11 (9-14 blank) 12 13 14 15 A. This would have been reported. As we went back, 16 it was in the data. It had been reported and it had not 17 been fully synthesized. 18 Q. In other words, it hadn't been correlated 19 yet? 20 A. Well, yes, 21 Yes. But there's a zillion other reports, as you 22 understand, so until ?????????????? did we look around at 23 all the other intelligence associated with this. 24 Q. Was all this information being kept in one file? 25 A. Oh, I have no idea. I presume. 80. 1 Q. Was this a file that you took a real interest in 2 and, for instance, kept on your desk? 3 A. No, no, no. I never kept one on my desk, not 4 knowingly. But when I got this, when I showed this, 5 ?????????? then I took a very big interest 6 in it. 7 Q. Okay. You say there ????????????????????? 8 ????????????????????????? 9 A. Can we have a bio? 10 Q. Sure. 11 (Recess.) 12 BY MR.CODINHA: 13 Q. Now, Admiral, in the interim, since we broke, 14 you mentioned you might want to add something. 15 A. I think it would be beneficial to you if we 16 focused on somewhat of a chronology, the best I can do. 17 Q. Please. 18 A. To bring it into focus ??????????????????? 19 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? 20 Q. Please give me that chronology. 21 A. Okay. Laos had been basically no intelligence 22 coming out. We had very little to no intelligence. And, 23 as I recall, there were something like 585 unaccounted-for 24 in Laos. Don't hold me to that number. And there had 25 been apparently or alleged very little interest -- not 81. 1 interest -- I should say effort exerted against Laos. 2 Some of the more sensational or at least the 3 ones that were in the forefront of the National League of 4 Families resolved around the Specter flights. And one of 5 them, as I told you on the break, had apparently been hit 6 in the air, allegedly exploded, and the crew lost. 7 However, the rescue teams reportedly had found two chutes, 8 good chutes, in the vicinity of the crash. And then 9 ??????? had reported or had (mt) that there had 10 been two some distance from there, but certainly within 11 the physical realm of being able to be two people, if they 12 had gotten out of the Specter. 13 So there was a lot of interest in and around the 14 sites in Laos. Now, we bring up to the point, and what 15 caused me to start focusing on Laos I quite frankly don't 16 know what precipitated this, and it possibly could have 17 been either refugees, report of people making ???????? 18 reconnaissance into Laos from Thailand. There was also a 19 report, and where this fit was they were bringing out an 20 American and they got recaptured and this guy that made 21 this daring rescue attempt had subsequently gone in and 22 had gotten captured and killed. 23 That was one of the many stories. And then I 24 told you about the coming out, and Sam Nuea is those cave 25 sites up in northeast Laos that I was trying to recall 82. 1 before that apparently were where -- that was the location 2 where the photograph that was given to me of a Caucasian 3 reportedly in a cave was taken, by whom I never knew. 4 And then we had the movement, reported movement, 5 of a prisoner, and I don't think it was necessarily 6 American, from Sam Nuea area down to -- it was not 7 ??????????? but somewhere in central 8 Laos. 9 At this juncture I started looking to see where 10 the reports were, and there were many more -- how many 11 more I don't know -- from different areas, from different 12 sources that all began to take on a pattern, and for some 13 reason I had become very much interested in Attapeu, which 14 was down in the southern part of Laos. And for some 15 reason Attapeu caught my fancy, for whatever reason. I 16 don't know. 17 But then that also contributed to the 16 realization that there seemed to be a prison or compound, 19 whatever you want to call it, associated with all the 20 provinces, and for the most part was geographically 21 centrally located in that province. 22 Now, how long before we had the report, or how 23 long we had worked on the cave report of the three before 24 (24-25 blank) 25 83. 1 more than any other did. So that takes us up basically to 2 ??????????? and the best I can articulate ???????????????? 3 (blank) 4 Q. Now, prior to ??????????????????? 5 have ??????????????????????? sources that focused you on 6 this that were available to be interviewed? 7 A. It was reported, but it was not first-hand. It 8 was only hearsay. 9 Q. All hearsay? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. And what was done on the hearsay reports, if 12 anything? 13 A. We never got to the source. 14 Q. Did you attempt to get to the source? 15 A. Yes, sir, we did. I must hasten to add on this 16 or offer this, I don't think nefariously, but I can assure 17 you that it was very porous in Bangkok, because when I 18 finally did go in on the Easter holiday, I happened to be 19 sitting across the table from an officer who was reporting 20 that I would be arriving, from a source that shouldn't 21 have even known that I was going. 22 Q. Easter of what year, '81? 23 A. Yes, sir. I was briefing the Chairman and the 24 Joint Chief ???????????????????? and they said ??????????????? 25 (blank) 84. 1 considered. I never did get to go home. Of course, 2 immediately was tabbed. So I went down ??????????????? 3 ???? flew out to Bangkok to give him what I knew at 4 the time ??????????????????????????????? 5 Q. On the human intelligence sources, are you aware 6 of a Vang Pao letter in 1979? 7 A. Is he gentleman that relocated (data) ? 8 Q. Yes. 9 A. I remember letters. We interviewed him, or I 10 had him interviewed, as I recall. 11 Q. Did he have anything ?????????????????? 12 ?????????? if you can recall? 13 A. I can't recall. 14 Q. When he was interviewed, was he polygraphed? 15 A. I can't recall. 16 Q. Was he determined to be a credible source? 17 A. I can't absolutely recall. In my estimation, he 18 was, yes. But I can't positively say that. 19 Q. Was there information that there was a letter to 20 General Vang Pao rather than a letter from General Vang 21 Pao? 22 A. I think it was a letter to General Vang Pao. 23 Q. What was the source of that letter? Do you 24 recall? 25 A. I don't know, and I could be mistaken on this, 85. 1 but there is a piece of trivia on this. One of the 2 conduits came out of San Diego, and they happened to have 3 lived in the same house that my wife and I lived in when 4 we were first married, for the first two months that we 5 were married, ?????????????? The address I 6 subsequently forgot. And that was associated with some 7 report out of Laos, and I think it was the letter that was 8 delivered to Vang Pao, or something like that. 9 Q. Are you aware of an individual by the name of 10 (name) 11 A. Not knowingly, no, sir. 12 Q. And was there any other follow-up that you're 13 aware of involving human intelligence relating to the POWs 14 held in the caves, perhaps near Kham Keut? 15 A. I just don't know. There were some caves 16 southwest of Sam Neua that had some reports, and we 17 followed up the best we could on those. 18 Q. With respect to briefings that you may have been 19 giving to the Joint Chiefs or senior policymakers, when 20 did you begin making the Joint Chiefs or the policymakers 21 (21-25 blank) 22 23 24 25 86. 1 them, but it was however soon I could come to the 2 conclusion or in my mind I had something that should be 3 brought to their attention. It was after I did some 4 analysis or caused to have done ??????????????? 5 We had an interagency group that were meeting at 6 that time quite regularly. As I recall, Armacost was a 7 member of that, or maybe it was (name) and Anne Mills 8 Griffith, the IC Staff, representative from Armitage's 9 office, J-5, ??????????????????????????????? 10 ??????????????????????????? . I stayed 11 solely in the intelligence-providing role. 12 Q. At the point where you began making the Joint 13 Chiefs or senior policymakers aware, was this intelligence 14 being closely held? 15 A. Yes. 16 Q. And was there a reason for that? 17 A. Oh, yes. 18 Q. What was that? 19 20 (19-25 blank) 21 22 23 24 25 87. 1 right off the bat. 2 3 4 A. 5 Q. 6 7 A. 8 9 10 11 A. 12 (2-18 all blank) 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Q. What time period are you talking about now? Is 20 this April '81 or before that? 21 A. Oh, it's before April '81. 22 Q. I have here something that's entitled Briefings 23 Presented, and it says at the top From Admiral Tuttle, 24 DIA, provided on 13 May '81, and then there's a signature 25 underneath that. Do you recognize whose initials those 88. 1 are? 2 A. I provided one on 13 May? That was a Friday the 3 13th. That was the day I read out of the program. 4 Q. Okay. Do you know what this document is? 5 A. No. 6 Q. Have you ever seen it before? 7 A. No. I've never seen 8 MR. CODINHA: Why don't we mark this as Tuttle 9 1? 10 (The document referred to 11 was marked Tuttle Exhibit 12 No. 1 for identification..) 13 BY MR.CODINHA: 14 Q. It's described at the top as Briefings 15 Presented, and there's a handwritten note, From Admiral 16 Tuttle, DIA, provided on 13 May '81 and then there's a 17 signature under it that I can't read. 18 A. I wonder if we could compare that. It doesn't 19 look like Tighe to me. That must be the very day, Friday, 20 the 13th 21 Q. This is entitled Briefings Presented, and the 22 first -- 23 A. Here's your chronology. It shows exactly where 24 I was. 25 Q. That's what we are going to have to go through 89. 1 because I've never see it and you've never seen it, so we 2 have to determine whether it's accurate. 3 A. Okay. 4 Q. The first indicator is early January '81, and it 5 says LTG Gast and MG Johnson. What does that refer to? 6 A. Gast was J-3. He was operations officer in the 7 Joint Chief of Staff. Major General Johnson, I don't 8 recall who he was. 9 Q. And this is entitled Briefings Presented. And 10 the other three individuals ???????????? What is that? 11 12 13 14 15 16 J-3 is the operations directorate of JCS. 17 Q. Who would that have been? 18 A. Gast. 19 Q. Oh, that was Gast. 20 A. And then they had the guy who was head 21 To put it in perspective, Gast had the job that Tom Kelly 22 had, the Army guy that was always on television here 23 recently and retired. 24 Q. So that ????? a separate. individual that 25 was briefed, is that right? 90. 1 A. Yes, sir. Or it may have been one whole room. 2 I don't know. But this puts it about right, early 3 4 (3-12 blank) 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 So by the time I started putting this together, 14 this early January probably brings it into proper 15 perspective. 16 Q. What was the significance to you of how much 17 18 19 (17-25 also blank) 20 21 22 23 24 25 91. 1 2 3 4 (1-9 blank) 5 6 7 8 9 10 Q. And it says Colonel Sterns. Who is Colonel 11 Stearns? 12 A. I don't know. I think he was an Air Force 13 colonel. 14 Q. And this Colonel Redmond, do you know who he 15 was? 16 A. I remember the name but I can't put a face with 17 either one. 18 Q. Do you recall what briefing would have been 19 given in early January 1981? 20 21 (20-25 also blank) 22 23 24 25 92. 1 guards, which I told you about, every other intelligence I 2 had on the issue. 3 4 5 (3-8 blank) 6 7 8 9 he's saying, was the one that either confirmed that -- 10 remember the guy I told you that was linked to another one 12 13 14 15 (11-19 blank) 16 17 18 19 20 from -- 21 A. I cannot clearly determine. I am confident, if 22 not specific certainly inferred, that it was in both. 23 Q. 24 25 A. Yes. 93. 1 2 3 Q. 4 A. 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 A. I do not know. 17 Q. But attempts were made to find that out? 18 A. Yes, it was. 19 In 20 what form did you receive that? Was that from NSA? 21 A. I did not receive it directly from NSA. I 22 received this in my analyst reports. 23 Q. How would the analysts have received it, if not 24 from NSA? 25 A. I have no idea. I don't know any other reason 94. 1 at this juncture other than from NSA. 2 Q. Are you aware of the analyst receiving 3 ????????????? from any source-other than 4 NSA? 5 A. Not subseque