SUCH REMARKS, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE GIVEN FROM A
PREPARED TEXT, WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY HIGHER AUTHORITIES (E.G. GENERAL POLITICAL DIRECTORATE (GPD) OR PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MILITARY COMMISSION). THEREFORE, EVEN IF THE SRV CLAIMS IT DOES NOT HAVE POSSESSION OF THIS PARTICULAR DOCUMENT, SOME SIMILAR DOCUMENT CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE EXISTED AT THE CENTRAL LEVEL WHEN THIS SPEECH WAS MADE. SIMILAR DOCUMENTS ARE NORMALLY CLASSIFIED "TOP SECRET" (TOI MAT) AND MARKED FOR DISTRIBUTION WITHIN COMMUNIST PARTY CHANNELS ONLY (LUU HANH NOI BO).
THE PHRASE "IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS OF THE POLITBURO" AND "EVEN AMONG US THERE IS A GROUP OF COMRADES WHOSE OPINIONS WHO DIFFER FROM THE OPINION OF THE POLITBURO" CLEARLY INDICATE THAT THE REMARKS ARE BEING MADE TO A BODY OTHER THAN THE POLITBURO, AND NEITHER THE SPEAKER, NOR THE BODY RECEIVING THE REMARKS, INCLUDE ANY MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO, HIMSELF AND THOSE APPROVING HIS PREPARED REMARKS. (E.G. THE U.S. MUST DECLARE A CEASEFIRE AND REMOVE PRESIDENT THIEU BEFORE REPATRIATION CAN BEGIN; DURING THE TIME THE U.S. IS RESOLVING THESE ISSUES WE CAN RELEASE SOME MORE PROGRESSIVE PRISONERS, IF NIXON DOES NOT HINDER THEIR RETURN OR TAKE DISCIPLINARY MEASURES AGAINST THEM; NIXON CAN COMPENSATE NORTH VIETNAM FOR WAR DAMAGES). OBVIOUSLY, THERE WAS AN OPPOSING VIEW TO THAT OF THE SPEAKER, AND APPARENTLY THAT VIEW WAS MORE CONCILIATORY TO THE NEGOTIATING POSITION OF THE U.S...
COMMENTS CONCERNING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE (ARVN) GENERALS ARE GENERALLY CORRECT, AND THE NOTED EXCEPTIONS CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE LACK OF FACTUAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO COMMUNIST CADRE IN REMOTE AREAS AND THE RESULTANT "SCUTTLEBUTT." THIS IS THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION REASONABLY EXPECTED TO HAVE BEEN PROVIDED BY SOURCES AVAILABLE TO THE LEADERSHIP IN FORWARD COMMANDS, INCLUDING LINECROSSERS, CAPTURED U.S. AND ARVN POWS, AND INFORMANTS WORKING IN THE AREA OF THE DMZ. THE ASSIGNMENT LOCATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PERSONALITIES MENTIONED IN THE DOCUMENT ORIENT THE SPEAKER TO CENTRAL VIETNAM, (PROBABLY MR4).
THE REFERENCE TO A "BA BE" PLAN PROBABLY REFERS TO THE WARTIME COMMUNIST PLAN TO INFILTRATE AGENTS INTO THE SOUTH VIA SEABORNE INFILTRATION UNIT C51 AND OTHER ORGANS FOR THE PURPOSES OF ASSASSINATION, INTIMIDATION, AND EXTORTION OF GVN/ARVN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS. THIS PLAN CAME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE U.S. DURING 1970 OR 1971, AND THE PHOENIX PROGRAM/PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNITS WERE SUCCESSFULLY DEPLOYED TO COUNTER IT.
COMMENTS CONCERNING THE 56TH REGIMENT ARE PROBABLY IN REFERENCE TO THE 56TH REGIMENT, 3RD ARVN DIVISION. THE 3RD REGT, COMMANDED BY LTC PHAN DINH VINH, MUTINIED AND SURRENDERED TO THE NVA AT CAM LO IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE ON 2 APRIL 1972. THE REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION IN HANOI WAS GEN VAN TIEN DUNG, WHO LATER COMMANDED THE 1975 GENERAL OFFENSIVE AND ALSO BECAME THE COMMANDER OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN). WITH THE EXCEPTION OF TWO AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL CAPTURED AT DONG TOAN BASE BY THE 66TH NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (NVA) REGIMENT, OTHER U.S. PERSONNEL ASSIGNED AS ADVISORS WERE ABLE TO EVADE CAPTURE AND RETURN TO U.S. CONTROL.
COMMENTS MADE BY THE SPEAKER, INDICATING HIS CONCERN ABOUT TAKING A PATH OF CONCESSION TOWARD THE AMERICANS, PROBABLY INDICATES THAT THE POLITBURO HELD A CONSENSUS THAT THE U.S. POWS SHOULD BE RELEASED, BUT THE SPEAKER AND HIS SUPERIORS DID NOT NECESSARILY AGREE WITH THAT CONSENSUS. THE COMMENT THAT "OUR VIEW" REMAINS THE SAME AND WE MUST RESOLVE THE ISSUE BASED ON POLITICAL AND MILITARY STABILIZATION PROBABLY MEANS THAT THE BODY REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER DID NOT AGREE WITH THE POLITBURO AND HELD THAT THE THREE CONDITIONS MENTIONED ABOVE MUST BE CARRIED OUT BEFORE THE U.S. POWS COULD BE RELEASED. (E.G. CEASEFIRE, REMOVE THIEU, AND WAR REPARATIONS PAID TO NORTH VIETNAM). BY THE DATE OF THIS DOCUMENT, THE NEGOTIATING POSITION OF THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT (PRG) (NOTE: FORMERLY THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT/VIET CONG AND REPRESENTED EXTERNALLY BY ORGAN "CP72") HAD ALREADY DROPPED THE REMOVAL OF PRESIDENT THIEU AS A PRECONDITION, AND THEREFORE, THE AUTHOR WAS MOST LIKELY IN POSSESSION OF NEGOTIATING POINTS OF THE "REUNIFICATION COMMITTEE," WHICH INCLUDED MEMBERS OF BOTH THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV) AND THE PRG, AND WAS SUPERIOR TO CP72.
COMMENTS CONCERNING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL INDICATE THAT THE SPEAKER IS ADDRESSING A GROUP OF HIGH RANKING CADRE IN SENSITIVE POSITIONS, BECAUSE THE EXISTENCE OF THE COUNCIL, ALSO CALLED THE "INTERMINISTRY" WAS NOT WIDELY KNOWN. HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COUNCIL WOULD BE NECESSARY, HOWEVER, FOR HIM TO HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION CONCERNING THE "BA BE" PLAN, WHICH INVOLVED BOTH THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR UNDER THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL. BOTH THE "BA BE" PLAN AND U.S. POWS WERE CONSIDERED AS PURELY INTELLIGENCE MATTERS, AND AS SUCH WOULD HAVE COME UNDER THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL, RATHER THAN THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION.
CONCERNING THE FIGURE FOR U.S. POWS ACTUALLY HELD "1205", IF ONE
SUBTRACTS THE FIGURE 972 (591 OPERATION HOMECOMING, 24 DIED IN CAPTIVITY (DIC) IN NORTH VIETNAM, 47 SOUTH VIETNAM DIC, EIGHT EXCHANGED, 300 GVNTHAITAIWANESELAO COMMANDOS, SEALS, AND PILOTS STILL HELD AS OF 1973), THIS LEAVES 233, WHICH CLOSELY APPROXIMATES THE LAST KNOWN ALIVE LIST FOR VIETNAM AND THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL AREA OF LAOS, WHICH WAS UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF MR4 WHERE LTG QUANG WAS ASSIGNED. ACTUALLY THIS LIST CAN BE INCREASED BY THE NUMBER OF POWS CAPTURED SUBSEQUENT TO THE DOCUMENT (63), WHICH CLOSELY APPROXIMATES THE LAST KNOWN ALIVE LIST FOR ALL OF INDOCHINA (305).
A CLEAR DEFINITION OF THE TERM "AMERICAN POWS" IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT, BECAUSE SOME ANALYSTS HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE OVERALL FIGURE FOR INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL WHO WERE CAPTURED ON "SPECIAL OPERATIONS" TYPE MISSIONS IS 470, AND 420 OF THESE MEN WERE STILL ALIVE IN PRISON DURING 1973. THIS CALCULATION APPARENTLY INCLUDES VIETNAMESE MACSOG PERSONNEL CAPTURED IN SOUTH VIETNAM, LAOS, AND CAMBODIA, OPERATION 34A PERSONNEL CAPTURED IN NORTHERN VIETNAM, AND OTHER THIRD COUNTRY PERSONNEL. IF THE AUTHOR OF THE DOCUMENT DID
INCLUDE MACSOG PERSONNEL IN HIS CALCULATION, THIS WOULD
INCREASE
THE FIGURE TO 1090, LEAVING A TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 115
AMERICAN
PERSONNEL.
SOME ANALYSTS, WHO HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE DOCUMENT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO VIETNAMESE PERSONNEL CAPTURED WHILE WORKING WITH THE AMERICANS, HAVE HELD THE OPINION THAT THE REFERENCE IN THE DOCUMENT TO "AMERICAN POWS" PERTAINS ONLY TO U.S. PERSONNEL, AND THE SPEAKER WOULD NOT LIKELY CONFUSE VIETNAMESE OR THIRD COUNTRY POWS IN THIS CATEGORY. I INITIALLY AGREED WITH THIS OPINION, BUT AFTER RECALLING THAT I PROCESSED THE DOCUMENTATION FOR SALARIES AND PER DIEM FOR VIETNAMESE AND THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS PARTICIPATING IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS DURING THE WAR, WHO WERE RELEASED OR ESCAPED FROM CAPTIVITY IN NORTH VIETNAM DURING EARLY 1973, MY OPINION CHANGED. ALL OF THE PERSONNEL RECEIVING PAY FOR THEIR PERIODS OF CONFINEMENT WERE DETERMINED TO BE EMPLOYEES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT BY THE FEDERAL CLAIMS COMMISSION IN HONOLULU, HAWAII, WHICH APPROVED THE CLAIMS.
THIS BEING THE CASE, AND CONSIDERING THAT THE AUTHOR OF THE DOCUMENT WAS REFERRING TO THE PRISONER POPULATION AS A WHOLE, RATHER THAN AN ISOLATED INCIDENT (E.G. BARON52), I CAN UNDERSTAND WHY THE AUTHOR WOULD HAVE REFERRED TO SPECIAL OPERATIONS PERSONNEL AS "AMERICAN POWS", REGARDLESS OF THEIR ETHNIC ORIGIN.
THE REFERENCE TO U.S. POWS BY NAME PROBABLY REFERS TO JAMES CUTTER (JIM KATLO), NORMAN CARL GADDIS (NORMAN KLARVISTO), JAMES HITESHEW (JIM INTIST SHASHT), AND CLEMENTS (CARMET). THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THE VIETNAMESE CONSIDERED JAMES CUTTER AND TWO OTHER PILOTS (NOT NAMED IN THE DOCUMENT) AS HAVING HAD SOME TYPE OF HIGH
ALTITUDE
TRAINING, AND THE OTHER THREE PILOTS (GADDIS, HITESHEW, AND
CLEMENTS) AS HAVING A HIGH NUMBER OF COMBAT HOURS IN
COMPARISON TO
THE GENERAL PILOT POPULATION. THE NUMBER OF PRISONS
MENTIONED IN
THE DOCUMENT (11) APPROXIMATES THE KNOWN NUMBER OF PRISONS
PRIOR TO
1972, BUT THE NUMBER WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN REDUCED AT
THE TIME
OF THE DOCUMENT. HOWEVER, IF THE VIETNAMESE DID PLAN TO
WITHHOLD
U.S. POWS AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENTS, SOME
OF
THESE 11 PRISONS WELL MAY HAVE BEEN OPERATIONAL AS OF 1972.
CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF LTG TRAN VAN QUANG HAVING
WRITTEN THE
DOCUMENT OR PRESENTED THE VERBAL REMARKS, HE HAS BEEN
REPORTED AS
THE MILITARY COMMANDER OF MR4 AND CONCURRENTLY THE MR4
REGION
PARTY SECRETARY. IT IS LIKELY THAT QUANG WORE TWO HATS
THROUGHOUT
HIS ASSIGNMENTS IN CENTRAL VIETNAM, AND THEREFORE, COULD
HAVE ALSO
BEEN MR4 REGION PARTY SECRETARY DURING THE TIME HE SERVED AS
COMMANDER OF MILITARY REGION TRITHIENHUE. MR TRI THIENHUE,
AKA
B4 FRONT, WAS UNDER THE DIRECT CONTROL OF THE CENTRAL
MILITARY
COMMISSION IN HANOI, RATHER THAN THE PURPORTEDLY VIET CONG
LEAD
CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM (COSVN) BASED IN DAMREI
PHONG
HAMLET, CHHLONG DISTRICT, KAMPONG CHAM PROVINCE, CAMBODIA.
IT IS
LIKELY THAT MILITARY REGION TRITHIENHUE, HEADQUARTERED IN
THE ANGO AREA WEST OF ALUOI, WAS ABSORBED BY MR4 TO COUNTER
ALLIED
OPERATION "LAM SON 719" DURING 1971. AT THAT TIME, GROUPS
559
AND 968 WERE COMBINED TO FORM THE 702ND COMMAND (BO TU LENH
702),
AND OTHER UNITS IN THE AREA (304TH DIV, 308TH DIV, 320TH
DIV, 2ND
DIV, 324TH DIV, THE 58TH, 64TH, AND 368TH ARTY REGIMENTS,
THE 230TH
AND 237TH AAA REGIMENTS, THE 7TH, 83RD, AND 219TH ENGINEER
REGIMENTS, AND THE 198TH, 297TH, AND 397TH TANK REGIMENTS)
WERE
COMBINED TO FORM MILITARY GROUP 70 (BINH DOAN 70).
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE PERSON DELIVERING
THE TEXT OF THE PREPARED
REMARKS WITH THE MILITARY PROSELYTIZING DEPARTMENT IS
IMPLIED BY
HIS REFERENCES TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL. THIS RAISES
THE
POSSIBILITY THAT THE INDIVIDUAL HAD ACCESS TO RECORDS OF
BOTH THE
ENEMY PROSELYTIZING AND MILITARY PROSELYTIZING DEPARTMENTS,
WHILE
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE NEGOTIATORS IN PARIS WERE PRIVY TO ONLY
THE
RECORDS OF THE FORMER. THIS MAY ACCOUNT FOR THE DISCREPANCY
IN THE
FIGURES CITED IN THE RUSSIAN DOCUMENT AND THE FIGURES
PROVIDED TO
U.S. NEGOTIATORS IN PARIS.
OTHER REPORTING INDICATES THAT LTG QUANG WAS THE CHIEF OF
THE ENEMY
PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT DURING THE WAR AGAINST THE FRENCH,
AND AS
SUCH WAS CLOSELY INVOLVED IN POW/MIA AFFAIRS, INCLUDING THE
EMPLOYMENT OF FRENCH STAYBEHINDS WHO ELECTED TO REMAIN IN
VIETNAM
AND WORK FOR ORGANIZATIONS SUBORDINATE TO THE GENERAL
POLITICAL
DIRECTORATE AND NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL. PRIOR TO BECOMING
HEAD
OF THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT, LTG QUANG RECEIVED
POLITICAL
TRAINING AND CHINESE LANGUAGE TRAINING IN KUNMING, YUNNAN
PROVINCE,
CHINA, WHERE WARTIME REPORTING INDICATES U.S. POW'S WERE
TRANSFERRED TO FORM VIETNAM. ACCORDING TO OFFICIAL
VIETNAMESE
SPOKESMEN, LTG QUANG WAS MOVED FROM HANOI FOR MEDICAL
TREATMENT IN
EAST GERMANY JUST PRIOR TO "OPERATION HOMECOMING", AND HE
REMAINED
THERE UNTIL OPERATION HOMECOMING CONCLUDED AND U.S./SRV
ECONOMIC
TALKS BEGAN IN PARIS. SINCE AT THAT TIME THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE
CONTINUED TO INSIST ON WAR REPARATIONS, AND THE U.S. SIDE
DECLINED
TO PARTICIPATE FOR THAT REASON, QUANG WAS RECALLED TO HANOI.
THE
VIETNAMESE WERE PROBABLY CONFUSED BY THE FACT THAT DR
KISSINGER
PROVIDED A LETTER PROMISING FIVE BILLION DOLLARS (3.25
BILLION FOR
ALL OF INDOCHINA AND 1.75 BILLION SPECIFICALLY FOR NORTH
VIETNAM)
TO THE VIETNAMESE LEADERSHIP ON 10 FEBRUARY 1973, BUT THE
U.S. SIDE
APPEARED TO BE RELUCTANT IN DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF WAR
REPARATIONS.
EVEN ALLOWING FOR SOME EMBELLISHMENT,
HOWEVER, THE FIGURES ARE NOT
INCONSISTENT WITH THE NUMBER OF POWS THAT COULD CONCEIVABLY
HAVE
BEEN HELD, IF THE VIETNAMESE PLANNED TO SUBVERT THE PARIS
AGREEMENTS. VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST METHODOLOGY ALLOWS FOR THE
USE OF
DECEPTION AS PART OF A RUSE, AND THERE IS NO PERSONAL LOSS
OF FACE
UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. THEREFORE, AS A MATTER OF
STRATEGY, THE
VIETNAMESE CAN BE EXPECTED TO DENY ANY KNOWLEDGE OF THIS
DOCUMENT.
AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, DUE TO THE ERROR FACTOR NORMALLY
ASSOCIATED WITH TRANSLATING NAMES IN REPORTING ON FOREIGN
LANGUAGE
DOCUMENTS, THE POSSIBILITY THAT LTG QUANG IS BEING TRUTHFUL
CONCERNING HIS LACK OF INVOLVEMENT WITH THE DOCUMENT, AND
THE
DOCUMENT WAS ACTUALLY WRITTEN BY ANOTHER PAVN GENERAL, SUCH
AS GEN
TRAN QUANG KHANH SHOULD NOT BE RULED OUT.
DURING THE WARTIME YEARS, CAPTURED U.S. AND FOREIGN
PERSONNEL WERE
EVACUATED THROUGH TWO SEPARATE CAMP SYSTEMS. PERSONNEL WHO
WERE
OBVIOUSLY PERFORMING NORMAL MILITARY DUTIES WERE PLACED IN
THE
CUSTODY OF THE ENEMY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT (CUC DICH
VAN/SOVIET
GRU EQUIVALENT) AND EVACUATED TO A CAMP OF THE MILITARY
REGION
(QUAN KHU). SUBSEQUENT TO EXPLOITATION, SUCH PERSONNEL WERE
FURTHER EVACUATED TO HANOI, AND COPIES OF ALL RELEVANT
REPORTS WERE
FORWARDED BY CLASSIFIED COURIER TO THE GENERAL POLITICAL
DIRECTORATE IN HANOI. HOWEVER, PERSONNEL WHO WERE SUSPECTED
TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN INTELLIGENCE OR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WERE
PLACED
IN THE CUSTODY OF THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES OF
THE
MILITARY PROSELYTING DEPARTMENT (CUC BINH VAN/SOVIET KGB
EQUIVALENT) FOR EVACUATION TO A CAMP OF THE REGIONAL PARTY
COMMITTEE (KHU UY) OPERATED BY SECURITY SECTION PERSONNEL,
AND
DIRECTLY CONTROLLED BY THE NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL OF THE
POLITBURO IN HANOI. COPIES OF ALL RELEVANT REPORTS
CONCERNING THE
CAPTURE, DETENTION, AND EXPLOITATION OF U.S. PERSONNEL WOULD
HAVE
BEEN FORWARDED BY THE SECURITY SECTIONS OF EACH VILLAGE,
DISTRICT,
PROVINCE, AND PARTY COMMITTEE REGION BY CLASSIFIED COURIER
TO THE
INTERMINISTRY/NATIONAL DEFENSE COUNCIL IN HANOI. IN
ADDITION TO
JUDICIAL PROCESSING FOR SELECTED DEFENDANTS, THE REGIONAL
PARTY
COMMITTEE ALSO CONTROLLED THE EXPLOITATION OF U.S. AND
FOREIGN
PERSONNEL FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. ONLY THE MILITARY
PROSELYTIZING
DEPARTMENT, AFTER COORDINATION WITH THE POLITBURO, HAD THE
AUTHORITY FOR ARRANGING PRISONER SWAPS OR EARLY RELEASES.
ACCESS
TO U.S. PERSONNEL BY THIRD COUNTRY INTERROGATORS FOR THE
PURPOSE OF
JOINT EXPLOITATION OF TECHNOLOGY, OR TRANSFERS OF U.S. POW'S
TO
THIRD COUNTRIES, WOULD HAVE NECESSARILY HAVE BEEN
COORDINATED BY
THE COMMUNIST PARTY INTERNATIONAL (COMINTERN) LIAISON
APPARATUS,
SUCH AS INTERNATIONAL LIAISON GROUP 101.
IN PARIS, AFTER OPERATION HOMECOMING CONCLUDED. THE TYPE
AND
EXTENT OF QUANG'S WOUNDS OR ILLNESS HAS NOT BEEN EXPLORED,
BUT U.S.
POWS HELD IN HIS AREA OF OPERATION (MR4) LATE IN THE WAR
WERE
KNOWN TO HAVE RECEIVED MEDICAL TREATMENT (E.G. LT RON DODGE,
LT
CLEMIE MCKINNEY, 1LT LARRY POTTS, CPT MELVIN FINCH, AND
OTHERS).
GENERAL OPINION: THIS IS AN AUTHENTIC DOCUMENT FROM THE
SOVIET
ARCHIVES. THE DOCUMENT PROVIDES THE TEXT OF REMARKS
PRESENTED TO
SENIOR OFFICIALS, PROBABLY INCLUDING GENERAL VAN TIEN DUNG,
THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION AND LATER
COMMANDER OF ALL COMMUNIST FORCES, POLITICAL COMMISSARS AND
OTHER
MEMBERS OF A REGIONAL LEVEL PARTY CHAPTER (DANG BO), IN
CENTRAL
VIETNAM (PROBABLY MR4), SUBSEQUENT TO OPERATION "LAM SON
719"
CONDUCTED IN THE SPRING OF 1971. LTG QUANG WAS PROBABLY THE
MR4
REGIONAL PARTY SECRETARY, AND A MEMBER (POSSIBLY THE
DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE) OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE COUNCIL AT
THE TIME.
THE DOCUMENT INDICATES THAT THE POLITBURO WAS AWARE OF THE
ACTUAL
NUMBER OF U.S. POWS BEING DETAINED, AS REPORTED THROUGH THE
POLITICAL AND INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS OF THE VARIOUS PARTY
REGIONS.
THE POLITBURO HELD A CONSENSUS THAT THE AMERICAN POW'S
SHOULD BE
RELEASED, BUT THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP DISAGREED WITH THIS
VIEW.
ALTHOUGH THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT (PRG) HAD
PUBLICLY CHANGED IT'S NEGOTIATING POSITION REGARDING THE
REMOVAL OF
PRESIDENT THIEU AS A PRECONDITION FOR A POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT, THE
MILITARY LEADERSHIP ALSO DID NOT AGREE WITH THAT POINT AS OF
SEPTEMBER 1972. AS WERE MOST STATISTICS REPORTED BY
COMMUNIST UNITS
DURING THE WAR, THE FIGURES QUOTED IN THE DOCUMENT ARE
PROBABLY
EMBELLISHED BY THOSE CONCERNED WITH RECEIVING PROMOTIONS AND
DECORATIONS (I.E. BODY COUNT SYNDROME), OR FOR
PROPAGANDA/TROOP
MORALE PURPOSES.
