Submitted by Marilyn Grote
There ARE Live American Prisoners of War in Southeast Asia and Our Government Knows It!
World War II
World War II was a great military victory on all fronts for the Armed Forces of the United States. However, there were 78,751 men and women - mostly military personnel - who were POW/MIAs at the conclusion of that war.
These losses included people whose ships were lost at sea with all hands disappearing with the ship, aircraft lost both over water and land, beach landings where thousands of men died in the surf and whose remains were carried out to sea, massive land battles and small unit firefights. It was a war we won. We had full access to crash sites, battle sites, and grave sites. There are many cemeteries on all fronts with headstones that read: "American Soldier (Sailor - Airman - Marine), died during a certain battle, on a given date, identity unknown."
As victors, we also had access to all the enemy prison camps. However, as in World War I, the United States did not realize the duplicity with which the Soviet Union would conduct itself in the closing days of World War II. Despite the total victory in Europe, USG documents now verify that 23,500 American prisoners of war, along with other Allied POWs, held by the Nazis were never repatriated. These POW camps were overrun by the Red Army in large part because General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, decided to stop the US and British drive eastward into Germany in order to wait for Soviet forces driving west. The primary reason for this move was so that US and Soviet forces could meet in Berlin. The end result was hundreds of thousands of Allied POWs, as well as millions of Western European citizens, came under Soviet control.
One such American GI was Martin Siegel, a prisoner in Stalag IV-B, Muhlberg - a Nazi camp in eastern Germany overrun by a Red Army tank battalion. Because he spoke Russian, he was assigned the American POWs' intermediary and translator with Major Vasilli Vershenko, the officer in command of the tank battalion. The first question Martin Siegal asked Major Vershenko was: "When were the US POWs to be repatriated?" To that, the Major replied that his primary concern was with the "Russian prisoners held in a separate compound at Stalag IV-B" as "they had to be interviewed individually since they felt that there were many 'cowards, traitors and deserters among them and they had to be dealt with expeditiously.'" Major Vershenko added that with regard to the repatriation of US and Allied POWs now under Red Army control, "the Russians and the Americans had agreed to a pact wherein the Russians would receive 'credits' for each American POW returned," and that the process would be a "complex logistical matter."
The Russian Major's view of the Russian repatriation process for financial and economic "credits" accurately reflected Soviet policy. This view was upheld by American Major General R. W. Barker, the Allied Chief Negotiator for the repatriation of Allied POWs under Red Army control. General Barker wrote in a report to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Allied Headquarters that after more than four hours of discussions with his Red Army counterpart: "…the SHAEF (Supreme Headquarter of the Allied European Forces) representatives came to the firm conviction that British and American prisoners of war were, in effect, being held hostage by the Russians until deemed expedient by them to permit their release. This latter point was further borne out by subsequent events." Major Vershenko's comments about economic "credits" were not wholly inaccurate. Weeks before V-E Day the Soviets had requested a $6 billion line of credit from the United States (equivalent to $59.8 billion in 1991 dollars). In fact, those "credits" were an active Soviet consideration throughout the repatriation period.
The Soviet rationale for not repatriating Allied soldiers and citizens was motivated by more complex and repugnant reason than merely money. In the memoirs of former Secretary of State under President Truman, James F. Byrnes, there appears an illuminating conversation between himself and Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Molotov: "Mr. Molotov came to see me, on instructions from Moscow…(Molotov) wanted to complain of the way in which the surrender terms (with Japan) were being carried out. He complained particularly about the way the Japanese Army was being demobilized. It was dangerous, he said, merely to disarm the Japanese and send them home; they should be held as prisoners of war. We should do what the Red Army was doing with the Japanese it had taken in Manchuria - make them work…No one can say accurately how many Japanese prisoners have been taken to the Soviet Union. In mid-1947, the best guess was that approximately 500,000 were still there."
The problems of accounting for POW/MIAs was complicated by the fact that the Soviets were just as uncooperative in the repatriation of the millions of displaced civilians. In Europe, as well as in the Far East, the Russians guarded a sea of prisoners whom they considered to be "human capital and slave labor" in their view. This included not only Allied POWs along with Nazi and Japanese troops, but also civilians from every country the Red Army passed through.
A window through which a glimpse of the fate of these citizens - in this case French POWs - can be seen in the following cable from the Allied Command's Mission in France to the Supreme Allied Headquarters for all of Europe, dated 30 May 1945 (V-E day was 7 May 1945). The cable read: "Accordance your telephone request, cable from Fifteenth Army French Detachment to General CHERRIERE MMFA Hotel CONTINENTAL PARIS of 25 May is paraphrased for your information. Report of Lt. D. HAVERNAS, according to confirmed reports, Russians still do not release thousands of French ex-PWs and civilians, forcing them to work. Many transferred eastwards to unknown destination. Please inform high authority. 700 ex-PWs are evacuated daily from this area to UDINE. Civilians held under difficult food and accommodation conditions."
The next day a cable detailing the magnitude of the masses of Allied prisoners of war and displaced citizens held in Soviet territory was sent from Supreme Allied Headquarters, signed by General Eisenhower, to the US Military Mission in Moscow. The General wanted an explanation from the Soviets for the slow pace of repatriation of the citizens. The discrepancies between the Allies' most up to date figures and the number actually repatriated were outlined in writing. More than two weeks later, General Eisenhower sent another cable to the US military Mission in Moscow with more detail discrepancies.
Once again he requested a detailed Soviet response to his concerns over these unrepatriated prisoners of war and other Allied citizens in Red Army occupied territory. The cable dated 19 June 1945 stated: "A further approach to the Soviets regarding numbers of western Europeans in Soviet occupied area of Eastern Europe is urgently necessary. About 1,200,000 French have been repatriated. Less than 100,000 remain in SHAEF-occupied area. French insist total POW and displaced persons is 2,300,000. Even allowing for several hundred thousand unaccounted for trekkers, discrepancy is still very great. About 170,000 Dutch have been repatriated, with less than 25,000 in the SHAEF area. Total Dutch estimate of deportees is 340,000." In other words, the number of men and women released by the Russians was far less than what the Russians claimed they released, and much less than the total number of people they held hostage.
These figures are truly astonishing. Hundreds of thousands of human beings of all ages and nationalities were swallowed up by the communists while the rest of the world stood by helplessly. The Soviet's claimed they "cannot say much about" the hundreds of thousands of Western European soldiers and citizens who apparently disappeared in Red Army occupied territory.
On 22 May 1945, an Allied-Soviet meeting was held in Halle, Germany to discuss the most expeditious overland delivery of Allied and Soviet ex-prisoners of war and displaced persons liberated by the Allied Expeditionary Force and the Red Army. This meeting, more than any other, determined the fate of hundreds of thousands of people trapped in the Red Army occupied territory of Eastern Europe. The Soviets agreed to give American and British POWs preferential release treatment; however, in regard to any political prisoners - the Soviets firmly and flatly stated all persons in this category had already been released and there were no more in their possession - period.
Months before the end of the war, the Western Allies and Soviets met at the Yalta Conference on 11 February 1945 to establish a mechanism to expedite the movement of the hundreds of thousands prisoners of war and displaced persons expected at the conclusion of hostilities. These provisions allowed their respective military officers into Allied and Soviet controlled territory at various collection points in each country throughout Europe in order to process, arrange for transportation and otherwise oversee the registration, care and feeding of the soldiers who were repatriated. The locations where these repatriation officers were to be sent was agreed to. Further, these officers would be assigned liaison officers to assist them in the repatriation process.
Less than a month after the Yalta agreement was signed, Ambassador W. Averell Harriman dispatched an URGENT TOP SECRET personal message to President Roosevelt. In part the cable said: "Since the Yalta Conference General Deane and I have been making constant efforts to get the Soviets to carry out this agreement in full. We have been baffled by promises which have not been fulfilled…"
Specifically, Mr. Harriman stated in the same cable "I am outraged" that "the Soviet Government has declined to carry out the agreement signed at Yalta in its other aspects, namely, that our contact officers be permitted to go immediately to points where our prisoners are first collected, to evaluate our prisoners, particularly the sick, (and transported) in our own airplanes, or to send our supplies to points other than Odessa, which is 1,000 miles from point of liberation, where they are urgently needed."
Mr. Harriman continued: "For the past ten days the Soviets have made the same statement that Stalin has made to you (FDR), namely, that all prisoners are in Odessa or entrained thereto, whereas I have now positive proof that this was not repeat not true on 26 February, the date on which the statement was first made. This supports my belief that Stalin's statement to you is inaccurate…..There appear to be hundreds of our prisoners wandering about Poland trying to locate American contact officers for protection. I am told that our men don't like the idea of getting into a Russian camp. The Polish people and the Polish Red Cross are being extremely hospitable, whereas food and living conditions in Russian camps are poor. In addition we have reports that there are a number of sick or wounded who are too ill to move. These Stalin does not mention in his cable. Only a small percentage of those reported sick or wounded arrive at Odessa."
Odessa was a Black Sea port in the Ukraine through which some 2,900 American soldiers were processed and repatriated. It is the only camp in the entire Soviet occupied zone in Europe in which US contact personnel were allowed and was the source of much of Ambassador Harriman's outrage. Six days later Mr. Harriman sent a very lengthy and blistering cable to Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. He spelled out in no uncertain terms the Soviet Government's blatant disregard for the Yalta Agreement, as well as their bald-faced lies regarding the implementation of the agreement. Further, he went into detail about the conditions under which our prisoners of war were subjected to exist at the hands of the communists. He ended the cable with the following list of recommendations for the Secretary of State to consider:
- That General Eisenhower issue orders to restrict the movements of Soviet contact officers in France to several camps or points of concentration of their citizens far removed from the points of liberation, comparable to Lwow and Odessa.
- That Lend-Lease refuse to consider requests of Soviet Government (additional to our fourth protocol commitments) for such items as sugar, industrial equipment or other items that are not immediately essential for the Red Army and the Russian war effort.
- That consideration be given to allowing our prisoners of war en route to Naples to give stories to the newspapers of the hardships they have been subjected to between point of liberation and arrival at Odessa and that in answer to questions of correspondents, the War Department explain the provisions of our agreement and the Soviet Government's failure to carry out the provisions of our agreement according to any reasonable interpretation. Mr. Harriman concluded the cable by saying: "I request urgent consideration of this question and the Department's preliminary reaction. General Deane requests that this cable be shown to General Marshall( General Eisenhower's second in command at Supreme Allied Headquarters)."
Cables were exchanged between President Roosevelt and Marshall Stalin regarding every aspect of the Yalta Agreement relating to prisoners of war. The Americans pressed the Russians, the Russian leader continued to lie about the number of prisoners under Soviet control as well as the treatment of the few he did acknowledge stating "it concerned him deeply" that President Roosevelt would think that the Soviets would in any way mistreat prisoners.
Marshall Stalin added: "I must also say that US ex-prisoners of war liberated by the Red Army have been treated to good conditions in Soviet camps - better conditions than those afforded Soviet ex-prisoners of war in US camps, where some of them were lodged with German war prisoners and were subjected to unfair treatment and unlawful persecutions, including beating, as has been communicated to the US Government on more than one occasion." In the end, the USG backed down allowing the Soviets to run roughshod over all captives under their control. The USG issued a new policy of censoring all stories of Russian mistreatment of US POWs effectively ensuring that the public perception of the Soviet Union as a stout ally of the United States would continue. Despite the fact that Moscow was clearing the release of every US prisoner held in Red Army territory - literally releasing them one at a time - the American forces were ordered: "…that no repeat no retaliatory action will be taken by US forces at this time for Soviet refusal to meet our desires with regard to American contact teams and aid for American personnel liberated by Russian forces."
At the same time the Soviets were attempting to blackmail the allies into giving them additional aid and recognition for their puppet states, they were forcibly repatriating Red Army soldiers who desperately did not want to return to Mother Russia. However, the United States was fully committed to the policy of forcible repatriation, the concept of which was included in the Yalta Agreement. The Allies believed this agreement would result in the repatriation of all of their soldiers and citizens. Unfortunately, nothing was farther from the truth. Hundreds of thousands of Russians citizens forcibly returned to the communists were either shot or sent to forced labor camps.
On 19 May 1945, four days before the start of the Halle meeting, General Eisenhower signed a able stating: "Numbers of US prisoners estimated in Russian control 25,000." Other cables between various US personnel and agencies, and cables between the Americans and Russians quoting large numbers of US and other Allied POWs still unrepatriated have been declassified over the last few years. One of these cables dated 30 May 1945 and authored by General Kenner, General Eisenhower's Surgeon General at SHAEF Headquarters, detailed the number of Allied ex- PWs and Displaced Persons reported being held captive in Red Army territory as follows:
PW DP Belgian 50,000 115,000 Dutch 4,000 140,000 British 20,000 American 20,000 French 250,000 850,000
On 1 June 1945, General Eisenhower sent another cable following the new official USG line regarding the number ofAmerican POW/MIAs saying that "only small numbers of US prisoners of war still remain in Russian hands." On the same day as the cable, the New York Times reported the War Department had announced that "…'substantially all' of the American soldiers taken prisoner in Europe are accounted for. Under-Secretary Robert P. Patterson said 'This means it is not expected that many of those who are still being carried as missing in action will appear later as having been prisoners of war.'"
While the Soviet Union transferred hundreds of thousands of people into their slave labor system in Siberia, the United States was faced with cleaning up the residue of the war - those men still listed as Prisoners or War and Missing in Action. This was accomplished through the arbitrary status change system established after World War I. The Office of the Chief of Staff of the War Department, whose main function was to resolve each outstanding case by determining - as soon as enough time elapsed to make it legally possible - that each man is "permanently lost," and therefore, dead.
In a classified "Memorandum For The President," dated 18 July 1955, John Foster Dullas wrote then President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a short report, the subject of which was "Americans Detained in the Soviet Union." This document was not declassified until 30 July 1991 and strikes at the heart the duplicity that developed on both side of the Iron Curtain in regard to POW/MIAs. It bears printing in its entirety:"
The American people share with other peoples of the world a real concern about the imprisonment of some of their countrymen in the Soviet Union. Most of these persons have been held since World War II. It is time to liquidate problems rising out of that War so that we may proceed with greater mutual trust to the solution of major issues facing the world today."
"Of greatest concern to American people are reports reaching the United States about Americans still being held in Soviet prison camps. The American embassy in Moscow had made many representations on this subject. While we appreciate the recent release of several Americans, others still remain in Soviet custody. On 16 July the American Embassy in Moscow gave the Foreign Office a list of eight American citizens about whose detention in the Soviet Union we have information from returning prisoners of war. Any action you would take to bring about the early release of these particular persons would help relations between our countries."
"We have also received a number of reports from returning European prisoners of war that members of the crew of the US Navy Privateer, shot down over the Baltic Sea on 18 April 1950, are alive and in Soviet prison camps. We are asking for their repatriation and that of other American citizens being held in the Soviet Union not only because of general humanitarian principles, but also because such action is called for under the Litvinov-Roosevelt Agreement of 1933."
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